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A RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 
A NEW STANDARD FOR INVOLUNTARY 
TREATMENT IN LIGHT OF CURRENT 
SCIENCE
Elizabeth Bennion
Mass shootings, such as the killing of school children and staff in 
Newtown, Connecticut, have provided brutal reminders of inadequacies 
in our nation’s mental health system. In the wake of these shootings, 
President Obama asserted that “[w]e are going to need to work on 
making access to mental health care as easy as access to a gun.” But 
what should society do when the person needing mental health 
treatment refuses care—when the problem is not rooted in access but in 
free will? When is involuntary treatment justified? In deciding whether 
to forcibly medicate, multiple interests come into play, including patient 
autonomy, public safety, and the patient’s medical welfare. As a society, 
we have overemphasized patient autonomy and underemphasized 
patient welfare to the detriment not only of the patient’s well-being but 
also of public safety—and even to the detriment of patient autonomy 
itself. This Article briefly examines the history of the involuntary 
treatment debate and how society arrived at the present imbalance. It 
then considers the implications of current scientific research on the 
brain and the nature of severe mental illness, using schizophrenia as an 
illustrative example. The Article explains how current involuntary 
treatment standards could be revised to reflect this scientific 
understanding and continue protecting a patient’s civil rights without 
making undue sacrifices of the patient’s long-term health and well-
being. It also defends the proposed new standard against potential 
constitutional challenges. 
          The new standard would allow involuntary treatment for a 
limited number of years after onset of severe psychotic symptoms under 
specified conditions. It would also provide for more access to medical 
information by patients’ immediate family members and primary 
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caretakers. The standard reflects (1) research showing the vital 
importance of early treatment for long-term prognosis and prevention 
of irreversible injury to the brain; (2) statistics suggesting the 
particular vulnerability of a maturing brain; (3) a respect for autonomy 
and the patient’s ultimate agency to reject treatment if no satisfactory 
treatment option can be found; (4) consideration of factors that 
uniquely affect autonomy concerns when patients are severely 
psychotic; and (5) research demonstrating that family involvement can 
greatly benefit treatment outcomes. Because brain science is currently 
an area of explosive growth and discovery, this Article recognizes that 
any involuntary treatment standard will need to be continually re-
examined and revised in light of scientific progress.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It must be remembered that for the person with severe 
mental illness who has no treatment the most dreaded of 
confinements can be the imprisonment inflicted by his own 
mind, which shuts reality out and subjects him to the 
torment of voices and images beyond our powers to 
describe.1
Mental health issues have been brought to the forefront of 
national debate by a series of tragic episodes. Deadly violence 
erupted at a political gathering in an Arizona parking lot, at a Batman 
showing in a Colorado movie theater, and at an elementary school in 
Connecticut.2 Such events can distort the public perception of the 
severely mentally ill, most of whom are not a danger to society.3 But 
the accompanying perception that this nation’s mental health system 
is in desperate need of reform is a fact. 
In the wake of these events, President Obama declared the 
necessity of “making access to mental health care as easy as access 
to a gun.”4 While knowledge of and access to appropriate services 
are certainly vital issues, they do not address the full problem—for 
what if a patient refuses the treatment offered? What if the problem 
is rooted not in access but in free will? 
Even when concerned family or friends of a severely mentally ill 
individual know where to turn for help and have the resources to do 
 1. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609–10 (1999) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).
 2. See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Tough Legal Issues Converge in Colorado Shooting Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/us/james-holmes-case-raises-complex 
-legal-issues.html?_r=1 (discussing both the Arizona and Colorado cases); David Brooks & Gail 
Collins, The Newtown Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 19, 2012, 1:24 PM), http:// 
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/the-newtown-aftermath/?hp (discussing mental health 
and gun control issues stemming from the Connecticut incident). 
 3. Sally Satel, Enforce the Laws, Don’t Add to Them, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/17/can-mental-health-care-reduce-gun-violence 
/enforce-mental-health-laws-dont-add-to-them (Approximately “3 to 5 percent of violent crimes 
in the general population” can be attributed to mentally ill persons “whose symptoms are 
unmedicated and/or who abuse stimulants or alcohol.”); Thomas Insel, Understanding Severe 
Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about 
/director/2011/understanding-severe-mental-illness.shtml (“[M]ental illness contributes very little 
to the overall rate of violence in the community.”). 
 4. Valerie Strauss, Obama’s Proposals on School Safety, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2013/01/16/obamas-proposals-on-school 
-safety/.
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so, there are legal hurdles to forcing an unwilling patient to receive 
treatment. There have been reports that the mother of Adam Lanza, 
the man who killed twenty children and six adults at an elementary 
school, may have been seeking to have her son committed to a 
hospital before she, too, was killed.5 If she was seeking involuntary 
treatment for Adam, she was doing so in Connecticut, which has 
been criticized as “among the worst states to seek such treatment” 
with “among the weakest involuntary treatment laws.”6
Such laws were created to protect the civil liberties of 
individuals who resist medical treatment. The movement to create 
these laws stemmed from serious abuses of many mentally ill 
patients who had been constrained under horrible conditions. This 
Article does not take issue with the importance of such civil liberties 
and autonomy interests. Instead, it argues that in reacting to abuses in 
history, the pendulum has swung too far. The modern legal debate 
regarding involuntary treatment has failed to sufficiently weigh the 
welfare of the patient in its analysis, especially given emerging 
scientific research about the nature of severe mental illness and its 
treatments. Autonomy concerns do not fall by the wayside, but this 
Article explains why they should be given less emphasis under the 
current scientific regime. 
Knowledge of the human brain is expanding exponentially due 
to new technologies that allow scientists to study living brains in 
unprecedented ways,7 and our laws have failed to keep sufficient 
pace with that changing scientific understanding in the mental health 
sphere. Nature, one of the world’s premiere science journals, has 
labeled this as a “decade for psychiatric disorders” because of the 
“many ways in which the understanding and treatment of conditions 
such as schizophrenia are ripe for a revolution.”8 Although there 
have been tremendous scientific advances, scientists and scholars 
 5. Adam Lanza’s Motive: Did Fear of Being Committed Lead to Sandy Hook Elementary 
Shooting?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012 
/12/19/adam-lanza-motive_n_2329508.html. 
 6. E. Fuller Torrey & Doris A. Fuller, The Potential Killers We Let Loose: The U.S. Would 
Have Fewer Mass Killings if Individuals with Severe Mental Illness Received Proper Treatment,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244075045781853 
61458883822.html. 
 7. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but 
Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1103, 1137 (2008). 
 8. See Editorial, A Decade for Psychiatric Disorders, 463 NATURE 9 (2010), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v463/n7277/full/463009a.html.  
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recognize that given the extreme complexity of the brain, 
neuroscience is still in its infancy9—and thus as the science 
continues to progress, further revisions of legal standards will likely 
be necessary. 
This Article proposes a new standard for involuntary treatment 
that incorporates relevant insights from current science. The standard 
offers an additional set of circumstances under which forcible 
treatment could be justified beyond those outlined in existing law. 
The standard is discussed more fully in Part IV, but its essence is that 
(1) if earnest efforts have been made to try to convince a patient to 
take needed medications voluntarily (including exploration of the 
reasons for refusal and possible alternatives to address such 
concerns); (2) and if involuntary treatment would be in the best 
medical interest of the patient; (3) then involuntary treatment would 
be allowed for as long as necessary to stabilize a case of severe and 
active psychosis. However, this standard could only be used for two 
years after the onset of such severe symptoms or age 27, whichever 
is later. These time limits respond to research showing the vital 
importance of early treatment for long-term prognosis and prevention 
of irreversible injury to the brain, as well as the particular 
vulnerability of a young, maturing brain. The time limits also reflect 
a respect for autonomy and the individual’s ultimate agency to reject 
treatment if no satisfactory treatment option can be found—tempered 
by factors that reduce certain autonomy concerns when a patient is 
severely psychotic. The new standard would also allow more access 
to medical information by the immediate family members and 
primary caretakers whose support, research shows, can be vital to 
successful treatment efforts.10
This proposed standard would make it easier to forcibly 
medicate an individual at earlier stages of disease. For that minority 
of severely mentally ill patients prone to become violent—the 
standard could help to prevent allowing them to deteriorate so far as 
to become a significant public threat. In this way, it would increase 
 9. See, e.g., Kathleen Kocks, Illuminating the Mind, GEO. WASH. RES. (Fall 2011), 
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~magazine/archive/2011_research_fall/feature6.html (quoting 
Dr. Anthony-Samuel LaMantia, founding director of the George Washington University Institute 
for Neuroscience). 
 10. See, e.g., Esther Pousa Tomas, Effectiveness of Family Work Interventions on 
Schizophrenia: Evidence from a Multicenter Study in Catalonia, 58 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY
587, 588 (2011), available at http://isp.sagepub.com/content/58/6/587.full.pdf+html. 
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public safety, but the focus of the standard is on what is in the best 
medical interest of the patient, while still preserving important 
autonomy interests. Thus, the focus is on a state’s parens patriae 
interest rather than its police powers.11 Every state retains its police 
power to confine anyone who is an imminent danger, but the hope is 
that society could help patients get necessary treatment long before 
such dire circumstances develop. 
Part II of this Article discusses the involuntary treatment debate. 
It includes a brief summary of the medical and legal history of the 
issue—and how the laws have responded to scientific developments 
in the past. It clarifies the opposing arguments and the current status 
of the law, which is rapidly changing due to political rallying after 
the Newtown shootings. Part III examines the evolving scientific 
understanding of the causes, effects, and treatments of severe mental 
illness, using schizophrenia as an illustrative example, and how that 
understanding is relevant to the debate over when the severely 
mentally ill should be treated against their expressed desires. Part IV 
proposes reform and explains why the new standard introduced in 
this Article would rationally reflect current scientific data and 
adequately balance autonomy and patient welfare interests. Part V 
addresses constitutional concerns and why the new standard should 
survive them. The Conclusion recognizes that in light of the rapid 
scientific advances in understanding the human brain and mental 
illness, this Article’s proposal is one that should also be subject to 
future revision. 
II. INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
A.  Brief Background: Medical and Social History of This Nation’s 
Severely Mentally Ill 
To understand the involuntary treatment debate, one must begin 
with some understanding of the history of this nation’s evolving 
attitudes toward and treatment of its severely mentally ill. 
For centuries, psychotic individuals were believed to be 
possessed by demons.12 In colonial times, many such people were 
 11. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right 
to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 288 (1992). 
 12. Thomas H. McGlashan, Treatment Timing vs Treatment Type in First-Episode 
Psychosis: A Paradigm Shift in Strategy and Effectiveness, 38 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 902,
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either locked in jail or watched over by their own families.13 A 
turning point for the United States occurred in 1843, when Dorothea 
Dix was visiting a Boston jail to teach Bible classes. As she passed 
through the building, she noted that a portion of the jail was not 
heated. When she objected, she was informed there was no need to 
heat that area because it housed the insane.14 Over the next several 
decades, Ms. Dix actively campaigned for better treatment of the 
severely mentally ill. She argued they required medical treatment 
rather than penal punishment. She convinced approximately thirty 
states to open asylums so that the mentally ill could be removed from 
jails. By 1900, every state had a mental institution.15
What began as a crusade with the best of intentions, however, 
degenerated into a serious problem of its own over the next half 
century. Many state mental hospitals became scenes of terrible abuse 
and neglect.16 Indeed, one book on the subject found that they 
provided comparable conditions to the Nazi concentration camps of 
World War II.17 News reports reflecting this kind of information and 
the release of an extremely disturbing and popular fictional movie on 
the subject (One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest) created public 
outrage and political pressure for change.18
Meanwhile, on the medical front, significant changes had 
occurred. Before the discovery of today’s antipsychotic drugs, 
patients suffering from severe psychotic disorders were often treated 
with sedatives such as barbiturates.19 They were “housed in 
institutions for indefinite periods of time, and treatment was often 
unsuccessful.”20
A major breakthrough in psychiatric treatment came in 1952 
when a French surgeon was investigating ways to reduce surgical 
902 (2012), available at http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals.org/content/38/5 
/902.full.pdf+html. 
 13. PETE EARLEY, CRAZY: A FATHER’S SEARCH THROUGH AMERICA’S MENTAL HEALTH 
MADNESS 64 (2006). 
 14. Id. at 65. 
 15. Id.
 16. Id. at 65–67. 
 17. Id. at 67 (citing ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (MENTAL ILLNESS AND 
SOCIAL POLICY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE) (1948)). 
 18. Id. at 66–70. 
 19. Alicia B. Minns & Richard Clark, Toxicology and Overdose of Atypical Antipsychotics,
43 J. OF EMERGENCY MED. 906 (2012), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science 
/article/pii/S0736467912003587. 
 20. Id. at 906. 
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shock. He “noticed that an antihistamine he was using, 
chlorpromazine, had a powerful calming effect on mentation.”21
Hearing about these results, a psychiatrist, Pierre Denker, tried the 
drug on some of his most difficult patients. “The results were 
remarkable, and chlorpromazine was approved by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in 1954.”22 Thus, the drug was not 
developed with any understanding of the underlying diseases or the 
drug’s interactions with the brain—it was entirely a serendipitous 
discovery based on the drug’s effects on behavior. A decade later, 
approximately fifty million people had been treated with this 
medication worldwide, and several other similar medications had 
entered the market.23 These drugs have come to be known as first-
generation or typical antipsychotics.24
Initially perceived by many as a miracle drug and cure-all for 
mental illness,25 it would later become clear that such drugs were not 
successful with all patients, did not treat all aspects of diseases such 
as schizophrenia, and had severe potential side effects, including 
tremors, rigidity, persistent muscle spasms, or restlessness26 and, in 
rare cases, death. Still, the drugs were remarkable in that they did 
make it possible to stabilize most severely mentally ill patients so 
that they could live safely within communities as long as they had 
access to treatment in community healthcare facilities.27
A second wave of antipsychotics would become available 
around 1989.28 Known as second-generation or atypical 
antipsychotics, these drugs were also effective in treating psychosis 
but had fewer of the extrapyramidal side effects. However, these 
drugs carry dangerous and undesirable potential side effects of their 
 21. Id.
 22. Id.
 23. Id.
 24. Jennifer C. Seida et al., FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION ANTIPSYCHOTICS FOR 
CHILDREN AND ADULTS 1–2 (2012) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth 
/PMH0040940/pdf/TOC.pdf 
 25. EARLEY, supra note 13, at 69. 
 26. See id. at 71; NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA 10 [hereinafter NIMH, 
SCHIZOPHRENIA] available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizophrenia 
/schizophrenia-booket-2009.pdf (last revised 2009). 
 27. E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., NO ROOM AT THE INN:
TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLOSING PUBLIC PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS, 7 (2012), available 
at http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/no_room_at_the_inn-2012.pdf. 
 28. Minns & Clark, supra note 19.  
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own, including issues such as increased blood sugar, elevated lipids 
and cholesterol, weight gain, and diabetes.29
President John F. Kennedy responded to some of these medical 
and social events in 1963 by signing a national mental health law that 
authorized expenditure of up to three billion dollars to construct 
community-based mental health centers across the nation.30 The idea 
was that state hospitals could shut down and patients could 
successfully survive in the community, so long as they were 
supported by the new drugs and these yet-to-be-created institutions.31
Thus the new law was, in large part, a direct response to the 
scientific development of antipsychotic drugs. 
State legislatures, responding to financial pressures, civil 
lawsuits, public outrage, and the promise of federal funding for these 
community institutions, began a massive closing of state hospitals.32
While in 1955 there were 558,922 state hospital beds for the severely 
mentally ill, currently “95% of [those] public psychiatric hospital 
beds [have] disappeared, but community psychiatric care exists for 
fewer than half the patients who need it.”33 By 2010 there were 
approximately the same number of state psychiatric beds per capita 
as there had been in 1850 at the beginning of the movement to 
provide more humane treatment for the seriously mentally ill—
approximately fourteen beds per 100,000 people.34 And, even with 
the hugely diminished number of beds, the trend in downsizing 
continues. A study showed that thirteen states had closed 25 percent 
or more of their total state hospital beds between 2005 and 2010—
some states closing upwards of 50 percent.35
Why was the three billion dollars not spent to create thousands 
of community health centers? Scholars cite multiple causes: the 
prolonged Vietnam War, the distraction of Watergate, the Reagan 
administration’s focus on federal downsizing, etc.36
 29. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 382 (3rd ed. 2007). 
 30. EARLEY, supra note 13, at 69. 
 31.  Id.
 32. See id. at 70–71. 
 33. TORREY ET AL., supra note 27, at 7. 
 34. Id. at 5. 
 35. Id.
 36. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 71; Steven S. Sharfstein, Whatever Happened to 
Community Mental Health?, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 616, 618 (2000), available at
http://psychiatryonline.org/data/Journals/PSS/3542/616.pdf; Mark Moran, Vision Revisited: 50 
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Some argue that the underlying problem was not that the money 
was unspent and the centers were never created in anything close to 
the numbers promised, but that those community mental health 
centers that were created never focused on caring for the most 
severely mentally ill patients released from the hospitals. Instead, the 
centers focused on those with much less severe mental health 
issues—“the worried well.”37 “Federal studies reported individuals 
discharged from state hospitals initially made up between 4% and 
7% of the [community mental health centers’] patient load, and the 
longer the [center] was in existence the lower this percentage 
became.”38
With state hospitals largely closed down and insufficient 
community resources to provide the support needed for successful 
integration into the community (for those that could be stabilized 
with proper medication and therapeutic support), prisons, jails, and 
the streets began filling with the displaced mentally ill.39 Mental 
health publications in the 1990s began to reference 
“transinstitutionalization,” meaning the transfer of the mentally ill 
from the state hospitals to jails.40 A mentally ill person is three times 
more likely to be incarcerated than hospitalized, and there are  
thirty-five thousand suicides by the mentally ill annually.41 It is 
estimated that there are currently 360,000 severely mentally ill 
people in our jails and prisons, half a million on probation, and more 
than a million that are processed through the criminal justice system 
every year.42 Today, the largest public mental health facility in the 
nation is a wing of the Los Angeles county jail.43 Thus, we seem to 
Years of the Community Mental Health Act, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=1769257; Michelle R. Smith, 
Kennedy’s Vision for Mental Health Never Realized, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 20, 2013, 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kennedys-vision-mental-health-never-realized. 
 37. E. Fuller Torrey, Fifty Years of Failing America’s Mentally Ill, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323539804578260023200841756.html. 
 38. Id.
 39. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 71; Shijie Feng, Madness and Mayhem: Reforming the 
Mental Health Care System in Arizona, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 541, 546–47 (2012). 
 40. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 71. 
 41. Dr. J. Jaffe, Op-Ed., Require Therapists to Warn of Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/17/can-mental-health-care-reduce-gun-violence 
/require-therapists-to-warn-authorities-of-danger. 
 42. Pete Earley, Saks Institute Distinguished Lecture (Nov. 15, 2012), available at 
http://lawmedia.usc.edu/mediasite/play/80b008e1e8284e35ab12db25fb2a45b7. 
 43. Renee Montagne, Inside the Nation’s Largest Mental Institution, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 13, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93581736. 
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have come full circle—once again punishing, rather than treating, 
our severely mentally ill.44
The shootings at Newtown that killed twenty children and six 
staff members at Sandy Hook Elementary School,45 as well as the 
shooter’s mother, refocused the nation on mental health issues. 
Indeed, never before had the political body reacted with such speed 
and determination to address a host of mental health issues, including 
issues related to treatment. In the beginning of 2013, the Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee of the United States 
Senate held a hearing on mental health. The chairman of that 
committee said it “was the first time in six years that the panel had 
really returned to a focus on mental illness.”46
B.  History and Explanation of the Involuntary Treatment Debate 
Although it seems clear that the state legislatures’ closures of 
state hospitals were mainly a response to financial incentives, 
another impetus for change was the concurrent wave of civil suits 
aiming to protect the civil liberties of the severely mentally ill.47
These suits changed the legal landscape in regard to involuntary 
treatment options. They also served as a focal point for the 
articulation of different visions of the needs, rights, and welfare of 
the severely mentally ill. 
1.  Different Perspectives: Medical Model v. Civil Rights Model 
The suits aimed at protecting the civil rights of severely 
mentally ill patients stemmed from a fundamental disagreement 
between those concerned with treating a patient’s illness and those 
concerned with protecting a patient’s autonomy and human rights. 
These two perspectives have been termed the medical and the civil 
 44. It is estimated that less than 50 percent of people with mental illness receive treatment. 
Erlanger A. Turner, Op-Ed., Improve Access, Erase the Stigma, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/17/can-mental-health-care-reduce-gun-violence 
/improve-access-to-health-care-and-erase-its-stigma. 
 45. See generally Marc Santora, A Bleak Procession of Funerals for Shooting Victims Ends 
in Newtown, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/nyregion 
/newtown-mourns-last-of-its-children-killed-in-massacre.html (explaining the Newtown shooting 
and burial of the victims). 
 46. Paige Winfield Cunningham, Newtown Renews Panel’s Focus on Mental Health,
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2013, 5:01 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/newtown-renews-
panels-focus-on-mental-health-86697.html?hp=r2 (citing Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)). 
 47. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 70–71. 
35551-lla_47-1 S
heet N
o. 138 S
ide A
      09/23/2014   13:40:53
35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 138 Side A      09/23/2014   13:40:53
C M
Y K
RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 9/1/2014 6:48 PM 
Fall 2013] A RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 263 
rights models, respectively—or, at times, over-generalized as a 
struggle between doctors and lawyers.48
Those espousing the medical model tend to view health as the 
predominant social value.49 Refusal of hospitalization or treatment 
tends to be perceived as merely a symptom of the mental illness.50
Because the purpose of hospitalization is treatment, the medical 
model views allowing one without the other as illogical.51 Because 
treatment will restore people to their “right minds” (thus increasing 
long-term capacities and freedoms), involuntary treatment is seen as 
promoting rather than impeding autonomy in a broad sense.52
By contrast, the civil rights model prioritizes the values of 
immediate freedom and noninterference with a patient’s present 
choices53—thus interpreting autonomy in a more narrow sense than 
the medical model. Whereas the medical model values well-being in 
terms of physical health, the civil rights model values well-being in 
terms of human dignity and respect.54 The civil rights model views 
treatment resistance as an act of free will rather than a symptom of 
illness. Advocates of this view would highlight examples such as the 
fact that we allow people to choose to smoke or refuse chemotherapy 
as evidence that people may rationally choose options that are not in 
 48. See ELYN SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE 
MENTALLY ILL 5–19 (2002); Jennifer Fischer, A Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse 
Treatment for Involuntarily Hospitalized Persons with a Mental Illness, 29 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 153, 154–57 (Winter 2006); see also Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting With Others: 
A Major Life Activity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1145 
(2002) (comparing the social model to the civil rights model); Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving
Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should 
Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83, 100 (2000) 
(demonstrating the legislative success of advocates of the civil rights model); Mary Crossley, The
Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649–59 (1999) (addressing the 
differences between the “social model” and the “medical model”); Lars Noah, Pigeonholing 
Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 291 (1999) (identifying 
a period of time when disability programs subscribed to a rehabilitative rather than civil rights 
model). There is also “[a] whole new school of mental health law called therapeutic jurisprudence 
[that] takes as its task the evaluation of legal rules in terms of their therapeutic benefits or 
detriments.” SAKS, supra, at 17. Therapeutic jurisprudence endeavors to find a middle road 
between the medical and civil rights models that focuses on the “law’s healing potential.” Bruce 
Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REV.
105, 108 (2000). 
 49. Fischer, supra note 48, at 155. 
 50. Id.
 51. Id.
 52. Id. at 155–56; see SAKS, supra note 48, at 5–19. 
 53. SAKS, supra note 47, at 12. 
 54. Id. at 17. 
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their best medical interest—yet as a society we do not force them to 
change related behavior.55 Likewise, the civil rights model demands 
equality of treatment for the severely mentally ill who refuse medical 
care.56
Among those who defend a patient’s right to refuse under most 
circumstances is Professor Elyn R. Saks. She has long been a 
renowned scholar of mental health law, but it was only in 2007 that 
she revealed to the world her severe struggles with schizophrenia.57
Her best-selling book published that year, The Center Cannot Hold: 
My Journey Through Madness, earned her a $500,000 MacArthur 
Foundation “genius” award with which she has established the Saks 
Institute for Mental Health Law, Policy, and Ethics at the University 
of Southern California Gould School of Law “to study issues at the 
intersection of law, mental health, and ethics as well as influence 
policy reform and advocacy actions for improved treatment of people 
with mental illness.”58 The Center Cannot Hold describes, among 
other things, her severe psychotic break during which she was 
forcibly medicated when she was studying law at Yale.59
On the issue of involuntary treatment she explains: 
As someone who benefits from medication, I know that the 
question of when one should be allowed to refuse is a 
complicated one. But I also believe that individual 
autonomy is vitally important, even precious—after all, it’s 
central to who we are as humans on the planet, with free 
will and self-ownership.60
Before publishing the book on her personal experiences, 
Professor Saks had published another book entirely devoted to the 
issue of refusing medical care.61 As will be discussed later in this 
Article, she does support at least one measure that would be a 
 55. Fischer, supra note 47, at 156 (citing SAKS, supra note 47, at 46). 
 56. See id. at 156–57; SAKS, supra note 48, at 5–19. 
 57. See ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS
(2007).
 58. SAKS INST. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, LAW, POLICY AND ETHICS,
http://weblaw.usc.edu/centers/saks/ (last visited February 5, 2014); see also Benedict Carey, 
Memoir About Schizophrenia Spurs Others to Come Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/health/23livesside.html?_r=0 (noting that Dr. Saks won a 
$500,000 MacArthur Foundation “genius” award). 
 59. See SAKS, supra note 57, at 2–4. 
 60. Id. at 262. 
 61. SAKS, supra note 48. 
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significant loosening of the restrictions on involuntary treatment but, 
on the whole, would respect the choices of the mentally ill so long as 
they are competent—even if psychotic and significantly impaired.62
This, despite her admission that she wishes she had not tried to get 
off medication at some points in her life.63
One scholar, mirroring the medical model values, criticizes 
Professor Saks’s position, in that if her autonomy had been respected 
in terms of allowing her to refuse medication, she might have lacked 
autonomy to make a host of other choices—beginning with returning 
to school.64 “Strategies for protecting the autonomy of patients who 
refuse medication must consider the serious erosion of autonomy that 
psychosis produces.”65
The medical model’s response to civil rights arguments was 
rather dramatically illustrated in a Los Angeles Times article by Jim 
Randall, a former president of the National Alliance on Mental 
Illness. 
Civil libertarians say no—that it is our right to commit 
crimes that land us in prison, that it is our choice to be so ill 
that we prefer to forage through garbage and live on the 
streets, that it is our prerogative to let voices in our heads 
torment us into sleepless nights. But something tells me that 
the people locked up in San Quentin with a mental illness, 
and the people roving the back alleys of skid row, are not 
singing “God Bless America.” These are our sons and 
daughters, our brothers and sisters, and they need our 
help.66
Thus, both the civil rights model and the medical model have 
strong advocates who are passionately concerned about the welfare 
 62. See, e.g., id. at 89, 93–94.  
 63. See Carla K. Johnson & Patrick Condon, Shootings Expose Cracks in U.S. Mental 
Health System, POST-TRIBUNE (Oct. 5, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://posttrib.suntimes.com/photos 
/galleries/15536969-417/shootings-expose-cracks-in-us-mental-health-system.html (quoting Ms. 
Saks, “Each time I tried to get off medication, I did it with great gusto and failed miserably. . . . 
Frankly, I’m sorry I wasn’t smarter sooner.”). 
 64. See Dora W. Klein, Autonomy and Acute Psychosis: When Choices Collide, 15 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 355, 394–95 (2008). 
 65. Id. at 388 (quoting Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse 
Treatment: Patients’ Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1049, 1054 (1988)). 
 66. Jim Randall, Helping Those Who Don’t Know They Want It, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/12/opinion/oe-randall12. 
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of the mentally ill. The two models prioritize and define their values 
differently—yet both are concerned with some definition or vision of 
patient welfare and autonomy. 
While not necessarily adhering consistently to either of these 
models for analysis, the legal scholarship on involuntary treatment 
for the severely mentally ill generally leans toward the civil rights 
model: if a position is taken on the proper standard, it tends to be an 
argument for either the strong status quo or even more stringent 
protections of the right to refuse.67 However, there are exceptions.68
2.  Legal Battles Over Involuntary Treatment 
“In the 1960s, at the height of the civil rights era, a small group 
of young lawyers focused on the fact that the civil rights of 
hospitalized psychiatric patients were being violated, which in many 
instances was true.”69 Thomas Szasz’s book, The Myth of Mental 
 67. See, e.g., Debra A. Breneman, Forcible Antipsychotic Medication and the Unfortunate 
Side Effects of Sell v. United States, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 965, 966 (2004); Jennifer 
Colangelo, The Right to Refuse Treatment for Mental Illness, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 492, 
493 (2008); Kristina M. Campbell, Blurring the Lines of the Danger Zone, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 175 (2002); Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The 
Constitutional and Moral Danger of Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute 
Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641, 642, 658 (2009); John R. Hayes, Sell v. United States: Is 
Competency Enough to Forcibly Medicate a Criminal Defendant?, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 657, 657 (2004); Dora W. Klein, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs: The Case 
Against Administering Involuntary Medications to A Defendant During Trial, 55 VAND. L. REV.
165, 170 (2002); Dora W. Klein, Unreasonable: Involuntary Medications, Incompetent Criminal 
Defendants, and the Fourth Amendment, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 161, 162 (2009); Amanda E. 
Lee, Protecting the Inmate’s Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 64 WASH. L. REV. 459, 460 
(1989); Megan Quinlan, Forcible Medication and Personal Autonomy: The Case of Charles 
Thomas Sell, 84 B.U. L. REV. 275, 299 (2004); David M. Siegel et al., Old Law Meets New 
Medicine: Revisiting Involuntary Psychotropic Medication of the Criminal Defendant, 2001 WIS.
L. REV. 307, 313, 378 (2001). 
 68. Dora W. Klein, Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill: Autonomy Is Asking the 
Wrong Question, 27 VT. L. REV. 649, 653 (2003) (arguing for a standard “allow[ing] involuntary 
treatment when, for someone who is mentally ill, the benefits achieved by involuntary 
treatment—the relief of the most serious symptoms of the most serious mental illnesses—would 
be sufficient to outweigh the harms caused . . . .”); see, e.g., Klein, supra note 64, at 394–95 
(arguing that autonomy should not be the sole concern in analyzing involuntary treatment); see 
also Lisa Kim Anh Nguyen, In Defense of Sell: Involuntary Medication and the Permanently 
Incompetent Criminal Defendant, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 597, 623 (2005) (arguing not for a more 
lenient standard but defending Sell partly on the basis that forced medication may prevent 
indefinite detention); Bruce J. Winick, New Directions in the Right to Refuse Mental Health 
Treatment: The Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 205, 238 (1993) 
(arguing not for a more lenient standard but explicitly employing a therapeutic model of analysis). 
 69. E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE TO TREAT THE 
SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 3–4 (2012). 
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Illness, was influential with some of these civil rights attorneys.70 It 
denied the existence of mental illness, arguing that so-called mental 
illnesses were simply arbitrarily defined categories of behavior.71
This view is no longer accepted in the mainstream today, but it had 
an impact on some of the arguments made for patients’ civil rights. 
One of the leaders among these civil rights attorneys, Bruce 
Ennis—a recent law graduate having no previous experience with the 
mentally ill, concluded that psychiatric hospitals were “places where 
sick people get sicker and sane people go mad.”72 His goal was 
therefore “nothing less than the abolition of involuntary 
hospitalization” and the permanent closure of psychiatric hospitals.73
In testimony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee in 1969, he stated 
that “[c]ommitment because of alleged danger to self or others 
should require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, based on a recent 
overt act or threat, that the person would, if at liberty, inflict 
substantial physical injury upon himself or others within the 
immediate future.”74 His articulation of this “dangerousness” 
standard would have great influence on the emerging law for both 
involuntary commitment and involuntary treatment standards. 
Much of the civil litigation on the issue of involuntary 
commitment and treatment occurred between the 1960s and the 
1980s—at the same time that deinstitutionalization was emptying 
psychiatric beds and closing psychiatric hospitals.75 Before the rise 
of this litigation, it was common for courts to generally leave the 
custody, care, and treatment of involuntarily committed mental 
patients within the discretion of institutional authorities.76
Extremely influential cases from this period included  
Lessard v. Schmidt,77 a case originating from a Wisconsin U.S. 
District Court that provided procedural protections for involuntary 
commitment, incorporated a least restrictive alternative requirement, 
and found that the Constitution required the state to prove “that there 
is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do 
 70. See id. at 77–79. 
 71. See THOMAS SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS, at x, 2 (1961). 
 72. TORREY, supra note 69. 
 73. Id.
 74. Id. at 78. 
 75. Id. at 4–5. 
 76. Cichon, supra note 11, at 286. 
 77. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
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immediate harm to himself or others.”78 Cases recognizing a 
constitutional right to refuse treatment from this period included 
Rennie v. Klein,79 Rogers v. Okin,80 Davis v. Hubbard,81 and  
Bee v. Greaves.82 In analyzing the influence of these cases, one 
scholar explained that they were 
cited again and again not only during their progress to 
finality but in the years after the final outcomes were 
handed down. And, they are cited as much for the verbiage 
and the rhetoric they employ as for their outcomes, if not 
more so. In fact, the way the cases are used by advocates 
and academic commentators alike suggests a heavy-on-the-
process, need-to-police-the-psychiatrists solidarity that fails 
to reflect the substantial differences in the diagnoses of the 
issue and the consequent remedies proposed or imposed by 
the various courts.83
The U.S. Supreme Court has rarely directly considered the right 
to refuse antipsychotic medications in any detail, although there are a 
host of constitutional principles that advocates and commentators 
have argued may come into play—including a liberty interest under 
the Due Process Clause, freedom of speech and thought under the 
 78. Id. at 1093. 
 79. 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that a patient’s right to refuse 
medication in the absence of an emergency stems from a constitutional right to privacy and 
requiring some due process procedures in that context). 
 80. 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361, 1364–66 (D. Mass 1979) (reasoning that “although committed 
mental patients do suffer at least some impairment of their relationship to reality, most are able to 
appreciate the benefits, risks, and discomfort that may reasonably be expected from receiving 
psychotropic medication.” The opinion refuses to define an emergency situation in broad 
psychiatric terms. It also recognizes a constitutional right to refuse based both on privacy and the 
First Amendment.) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom.,
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), Rogers v. Comm’r, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983).
 81. 506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (“[U]nlike some of the courts which have 
derived the right to refuse treatment from the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, as well 
as the ‘penumbras’ and ‘shadows’ of these and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, this 
Court believes the source of the right can best be understood as substantive due process, or 
phrased differently, as an aspect of ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 82. 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that “[g]iven the undisputed nature of 
antipsychotic drugs, . . . a pretrial detainee retains a liberty interest derived from the Constitution 
in avoiding unwanted medication with such drugs,” but that interest “must be balanced against 
competing state interests to determine whether it is outweighed by the demands of an organized 
society” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 83. Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, Overriding Mental Health Treatment Refusals: 
How Much Process Is “Due”?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 501, 531 (2008). 
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First Amendment, the right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment, 
the Equal Protection Clause (because non-mentally ill patients may 
generally refuse medical treatment), and the penumbral right to 
privacy.84
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of the 
right to refuse psychotropic medications when a state has no criminal 
justice interest involved. But it has addressed such involuntary 
treatment issues for a convicted prisoner,85 a detainee during trial,86
and a detainee for whom such medication may be required to 
establish competency for a future trial “for serious, but nonviolent 
crimes.”87
These cases all focused on involuntary treatment issues in the 
criminal context but are not entirely relevant to the issue at hand, 
because this Article addresses an appropriate involuntary treatment 
standard regardless of whether the situation involves a criminal 
justice issue. However, these cases have included relevant reasoning 
that has influenced laws and legal argument regarding involuntary 
treatment both within and outside a criminal justice context. 
For example, Washington v. Harper recognized “a significant 
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of 
antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”88 In recognizing that liberty interest, the Court put 
substantial emphasis on dangerous potential side effects of the 
drugs.89 Harper required a finding of dangerousness and that it was 
in an inmate’s medical interest to forcibly medicate,90 but it was 
initially unclear how broadly this standard might apply outside a 
prison context. 
Riggins v. Nevada held that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
affords at least as much protection to persons the State detains for 
trial” as it does for convicted prisoners as addressed in Harper.91
Riggins therefore required not only medical appropriateness and an 
“overriding justification” (thus characterizing Harper’s
 84. MELTON et al., supra note 29, at 382–83. 
 85. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 86. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 129 (1992). 
 87. Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003). 
 88. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221–22. 
 89. Id. at 229–30. 
 90. Id. at 227. 
 91. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. 
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“dangerousness” standard as a subset of such justifications rather 
than the standard in itself), but also a consideration of “less intrusive 
alternatives.”92 While Riggins did not consider whether First 
Amendment rights were involved, the court was clearly concerned 
with antipsychotic medication’s potential effects on 
communication.93
Most recently, in Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that antipsychotic medications can be involuntarily administered to 
render competency for trial if: 
[1] a mentally ill defendant [2] [is] facing serious criminal 
charges . . . [and] [3] the treatment is medically appropriate 
[and] [4] is substantially unlikely to have side effects that 
may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, [5] taking 
account of less intrusive alternatives, [6] is necessary [to] 
significantly . . . further important governmental trial-
related interests.94
The Court elaborated on the proper meaning and analysis of these 
points in significant length and detail and then promptly proceeded to 
discourage this test’s use.95 The Court explained that the test would 
not be necessary if a reviewing court could base the order for forced 
medication on a different purpose than simply competency for trial.96
As alternative purposes, the Court provided the example of Harper
with “purposes . . . related to the individual’s dangerousness, or 
purposes related to the individual’s own interests where refusal to 
take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.”97 The Court explicitly 
stated that such alternative purposes (and thus alternative tests) 
should be used “before turning to the trial competence question”98
and that authorizing medication on alternative grounds would make 
any need to consider competency grounds “likely disappear.”99
Thus, relevant themes of recurring concern for the various courts 
in these cases include liberty and privacy interests, medical 
appropriateness, side effects of the medications (both in terms of 
 92. Id.
 93. See id. at 137. 
 94. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
 95. Id. at 181–82. 
 96. Id.
 97. Id. at 182. 
 98. Id.
 99. Id. at 183. 
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danger/discomfort to the patient and interference with 
communication), grave disability, less restrictive alternatives, safety 
of the community, and various other potential state interests. 
3.  Current State of Involuntary Treatment (and Related) Laws 
State laws have developed both in response to cases, such as 
those described above, and as a reaction to various events and 
political pressures. For example,  
[b]efore the Lessard decision, only nine states used 
‘dangerousness’ as the sole criterion for involuntary 
psychiatric hospitalization. By 1980, every state had 
changed its statute to restrict hospitalization to persons who 
were dangerous to themselves or others . . . or had 
interpreted its preexisting statute in a way so as to save it 
from being found unconstitutional.100
These laws “made it difficult—and illegal in some states—to force a 
person into treatment unless he or she was homicidal or suicidal.”101
Responding to such standards, one physician, Dr. Darold Treffert, 
collected stories of those that could not qualify for involuntary 
treatment and later killed themselves—he coined the phrase “dying 
with their rights on.”102
Today, “[t]he pendulum is slowly returning to a reasonable 
balance,” Dr. Treffert observed in a 2012 Associated Press news 
article.103 Currently, the vast majority of states allow intervention on 
broader grounds than “dangerousness to self and others,” though a 
small minority continues to require “dangerousness” as the sole basis 
for intervention and ordering treatment.104
Standards vary among the states, but often another ground is 
“grave disability,” which usually focuses on the person’s ability to 
 100. TORREY, supra note 69, at 123 (citing DG Langsley & JT Barter, Community Mental 
Health in California, 122 W. J. MED. 271 (1975); SP Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the 
Psychiatric Emergency Room, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 753 (1988); PAUL S.
APPLEBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 28 
(1994)).
 101. Johnson & Condon, supra note 63. 
 102. Id.
 103. Id.
 104. See Improved Treatment Standards, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., http:// 
www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/solution/improved-treatment-standards (last visited Sept. 21, 
2013).
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meet basic survival needs.105 A significant number of states have also 
added “need-for-treatment” provisions. Definitions of such 
provisions again vary among the states, but might, for example, 
allow intervention if it was necessary to prevent further psychiatric 
deterioration.106 Arizona, which is among the more lenient states in 
this area, allows any concerned party to petition the court for an 
order of treatment. An evaluation and subsequent care may be 
mandated if the person is found to be “persistently and acutely 
disabled” by severe mental illness and “likely to benefit from 
treatment.”107 Jared Loughner might have been prevented from 
shooting former Representative Gabrielle Giffords, and killing and 
wounding a host of others, had someone filed such a petition—
especially given his “worrisome track record—the number of times 
the campus police were called to intervene; the pressing concerns of 
his teacher and of other students; and the . . . fact that the college 
would not readmit him after his suspension without psychiatric 
clearance.”108
Civil commitment of a psychotic individual does not guarantee 
the ability to get treatment. “Another court order [may be] necessary 
for doctors to treat hospitalized patients against their will.”109 As 
explained above, a court may consider whatever relevant grounds the 
statutes of a state provide for determining whether medication may 
be forcibly administered. Doctors (and a court) will also consider a 
patient’s competency to make the medication decision, but as one 
scholar explained, the test for such competency is usually remarkably 
low.
Generally, tests for determining competency to make 
medical treatment decisions require only that someone 
possess the capacity to understand the potential advantages 
and disadvantages of a proposed treatment. These tests aim 
to minimize medical paternalism and promote individual 
autonomy by finding that almost all people are competent to 
make their own treatment decisions. And these tests do find 
 105. Id.
 106. Id.
 107. Satel, supra note 3. 
 108. Id.
 109. Lloyd I. Sederer, The Tragedy of Mental-Health Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324081704578234002322233718.html. 
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almost all people competent, even people with severe 
mental illnesses. Most people with severe mental illnesses, 
including some people who are experiencing active 
psychotic episodes, are not so impaired that they are 
incapable of understanding a proposed medical treatment. 
They might refuse treatment for their psychotic symptoms 
on the basis of unlikely or even obviously false beliefs—
most often, the belief that they are not ill—but such beliefs 
do not necessarily make them incapable of comprehending 
the proposed treatment. The result is that many people who 
are subject to civil commitment are competent to refuse 
medical treatment.110
Privacy laws also frequently frustrate parents and family 
members of severely mentally ill patients. “The 1996 federal law 
known as HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act) is meant to protect the medical information of 
individuals, but it has also come to limit what a doctor can say to a 
patient’s family (with the exception of unemancipated minors).”111
This can inhibit educated family support, which research has shown 
can greatly affect treatment outcomes.112
As of January 2013, forty-five states had Assisted Outpatient 
Treatment laws (AOT).113 Such laws vary by state, but under certain 
conditions (such as a history of frequent hospitalizations and/or 
violence) they provide court-ordered treatment for severely mentally 
ill patients who have a history of treatment noncompliance as a 
condition of remaining in the community.114 In other words, if they 
 110. Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to Make Medical Treatment 
Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 562–63 (2012) 
(emphasis added). See generally Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: 
Three Alternatives to the Law’s Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 689, 691–92 (1993) 
(providing an in-depth discussion of competency). 
 111. Sederer, supra note 108. 
 112. See Tomas, supra note 10.  
 113. Assisted Outpatient Treatment Laws, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/solution/assisted-outpatient-treatment-laws (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2013) (“The five states that do not have AOT are Connecticut, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Tennessee.”). See Lori R. Holyfield, One Fell Through the 
Cracks: Why Tennessee Needs an Initial Outpatient Commitment Statute, 42 U. MEM. L. REV.
221, 232 (2011); Bruce J. Winick et al., Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 94 (2003). 
 114. See Steven K. Erickson, Michael J. Vitacco & Gregory J. Van Rybroek, Beyond Overt 
Violence: Wisconsin’s Progressive Civil Commitment Statute As A Marker of A New Era in 
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choose not to take their medications, these severely mentally ill 
patients may be civilly committed for a specified period of time.115
One of the most famous examples that spawned increased national 
interest is Kendra’s Law of New York—named for a young woman 
who died in 1999 after being pushed in front of a subway train by a 
schizophrenic man with a history of violence who failed to take his 
medication.116 New York was relatively late in adopting such a 
statute,117 but many states had not (and some still do not) make 
significant use of the AOT provisions they have adopted.118 Some 
(but not all) studies have linked AOT programs with increased 
participation in case management and reduced arrests, 
hospitalizations, assaults, threats of violence, incarceration, and 
homelessness.119
In the wake of the Newtown shootings, many lawmakers are 
reconsidering mental health laws. Gun control laws in New York that 
were passed in the aftermath of Newtown included a measure to 
strengthen Kendra’s Law but, according to critics, “left big gaps in 
the safety net that scream for closure.”120 In January 2013, the New
York Times reported that 
Mental Health Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 384 (2005) (explaining some states also use 
“predicted deterioration” statutes—these “states allow involuntary commitment to rest on a 
prediction of future deterioration or relapse of mental illness, with only a portion of [those states] 
requiring a further link to dangerousness.”). Paul P. Christopher & Debra A. Pinals Civil 
Commitment Based on Predicted Deterioration, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 399, 401
(2009), available at http://www.jaapl.org/content/37/3/399.full.
 115. See Assisted Outpatient Treatment Laws, supra note 112. 
 116. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among 
Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 402 (2006); Ilissa L. Watnik, A
Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s Law: New York’s Solution for Treatment of the Chronically 
Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2001). 
 117. See Kathryn A. Worthington, Kendr’s Law and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: An 
Empirical Peek Behind the Courts’ Legal Analysis and A Suggested Template for the New York 
State Legislature’s Reconsideration for Renewal in 2010, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 
224 (2009). 
 118. See Monahan, supra note 116 at 401–02; TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., MENTAL 
HEALTH POLICY REFORMS TO REDUCE MASS SHOOTINGS (2013), available at http:// 
www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/proposalsformentalhealthpolicyreform.1.4 
.12.pdf. 
 119. See Richard Glasgow, Forced Medication of Criminal Defendants and the Unintended 
Consequences of Sell v. United States, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 235, 253 (2005); 
Satel, supra note 3. 
 120. Editorial, Halfway on Kendra’s Law, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 22, 2013, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/halfway-kendra-law-article-1.1244483 (stating the new 
amendments included provisions to extend the maximum term of forced treatment orders, create 
statewide enforcement, and mandate the evaluation of state prison inmates being discharged from 
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Legislation to revise existing mental health laws is under 
consideration in at least a half-dozen states . . . . A New 
York bill requiring mental health practitioners to warn the 
authorities about potentially dangerous patients was signed 
into law on [January 15, 2013]. In Washington, President 
Obama has ordered “a national dialogue” on mental health, 
and a variety of bills addressing mental health issues are 
percolating on Capitol Hill.121
The proposals being considered across the nation “include 
strengthening mental health services, lowering the threshold for 
involuntary commitment and increasing requirements for reporting 
worrisome patients to the authorities.”122 In February 2013, a 
bipartisan group of senators, citing renewed urgency due to the 
Newtown shootings, introduced legislation that “would put in place 
standards for about 2,000 ‘federally qualified’ community behavioral 
health centers, requiring them to provide such services as substance 
abuse treatment and 24-hour crisis care” in return for being able to 
bill Medicaid for their services.123 This, of course, is different from 
but reminiscent of President John F. Kennedy’s original plan. 
Thus, the law is currently in a state of great flux. Newtown has 
caused a long overdue reassessment of a system that is “fragmented 
and drastically inadequate.”124 But while mental health advocates 
find some of the proposals appealing, others are troublesome—
particularly the reporting requirements that might discourage patients 
from seeking care or providing full disclosure to physicians.125 The 
emphasis of the reforms seems to be on prevention of violence and 
state-run psychiatric facilities). But the new provisions do not require evaluations of those 
mentally ill housed in locally run jails, psychiatric wards in non-state hospitals, or those housed in 
secure state-run psychiatric facilities who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. See 
id.
 121. Erica Goode & Jack Healy, Focus on Mental Health Laws to Curb Violence is Unfair, 
Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/us/focus-on-mental-
health-laws-to-curb-violence-is-unfair-some-say.html?ref=mentalhealthanddisorders. 
 122. Id.
 123. Brady Dennis & Paul Kane, Measure Would Strengthen Mental Health-care System,
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/measure-
would-strengthen-mental-health-care-system/2013/02/07/dd64db44-714d-11e2-ac36 
-3d8d9dcaa2e2_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines. 
 124. Goode & Healey, supra note 121. 
 125. See id.; Benedict Carey & Anemona Hartocollis, Warning Signs of Violent Acts Often 
Unclear, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/health/breaking-link-of 
-violence-and-mental-illness.html?ref=mentalhealthanddisorders. 
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access to services—which is laudable, but not sufficient. The lack of 
resources for mental health treatment has been a tremendous 
problem, but leading a person to water is only the first step in 
quenching thirst. What if the person refuses to drink? The next 
section examines the current science and its implications for that 
question.
III. INSIGHTS FROM SCIENCE
Human brains are “the most complexly organized things in the 
known universe.”126 A single cubic millimeter of brain tissue 
contains approximately one hundred million synaptic connections 
between neurons, and a cubic centimeter has as many synaptic 
connections as there are stars in the Milky Way galaxy.127 The 
brain’s “hundred billion neurons and several hundred trillion 
synaptic connections can process and exchange prodigious amounts 
of information over a distributed neural network in the matter of 
milliseconds.”128 Dr. Eric Kandel, a Nobel Prize winning 
neuroscientist and professor at Columbia University, asserts that 
severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, are the most 
complicated illnesses in all of medicine, because they not only 
involve the body’s most complex organ, but also the most complex 
functions of that organ.129
Why did Nature, the premiere science journal, assert that this is 
“[a] decade for psychiatric disorders,” and that there are “many ways 
in which the understanding and treatment of conditions such as 
schizophrenia are ripe for a revolution”?130 The reasons include the 
tremendous pace of scientific advances that are providing new 
insight into the nature of severe mental illnesses like schizophrenia. 
Indeed, knowledge of the human brain is expanding exponentially.131
 126. Eddy Nahmias, Is Neuroscience the Death of Free Will?, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR
(Nov. 13, 2007, 5:25 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/is-neuroscience-the 
-death-of-free-will/. 
 127. See DAVID EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO: THE SECRET LIVES OF THE BRAIN 1–2 (2011). 
 128. Rene Marois & Jason Ivanoff, Capacity Limits of Information Processing in the Brain, 9 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 296, 296 (2005), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com 
/science/article/pii/S1364661305001178. 
 129. Charlie Rose: The Mentally Ill Brain (television broadcast June 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/11078.  
 130. Editorial, supra note 8.
 131. Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment,
56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1137 (2008). 
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New techniques such as genome-wide association studies, 
sophisticated brain imaging, and optical manipulation of neural 
circuits provide opportunities to discover the neural circuitry 
underlying cognitive dysfunction and to develop better prediction, 
treatment, and prevention options.132 Indeed, these exciting new 
technologies that allow for unprecedented insight into the brain, 
coupled with the brain’s incredible complexity, have led prominent 
scholars to label this not just the decade of psychiatric disorders, but 
also the century of the brain.133 This claim was further supported by 
the 2013 State of the Union announcement of a new decade-long 
government funded effort to map the active human brain.134
The purpose of this section is to examine this developing science 
regarding schizophrenia and to consider the implications for issues 
surrounding the involuntary treatment debate. In doing so, this 
Article falls within a relatively new field of research that draws 
connections between neuroscience and law. The growth of 
scholarship in this field that some call “neurolaw” has been 
astounding—a survey in 2009 found “a 300 [percent] increase over 
the number [of related scholarly articles] published just five years 
earlier, and . . . a 2,000 [percent] increase over the number published 
a decade before.”135
Despite the explosive growth of neurolaw literature, the 
scholarship has not included a broad-based and in-depth analysis of 
the relation of recent progress in the brain sciences to the involuntary 
treatment of the severely mentally ill. Very few articles have touched 
on some of these issues, but with a significantly narrower or simply 
 132. Editorial, supra note 8.
 133. For example, Eric Kandel, a Nobel Prize-winning neuroscientist, predicted that just as 
the gene was the target of biological sciences in the second half of the 20th century, the new 
technologies allowing unprecedented study of the brain will make it the main focus of the 
biological sciences for the 21st century. Charlie Rose: The Great Mysteries of the Human Brain,
(television broadcast Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview 
/10694. Hank Greely, Director for the Center of Law and Biosciences at Stanford University, also 
said that “neuroscience is going to be the most fascinating science of this coming century . . . and 
it’s going to be the most socially important.” Stanford’s Hank Greely on Research Advances vs. 
Social Challenges, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.nimh.nih.gov 
/news/media/video/stanfords-hank-greely-on-research-advances-vs-social-challenges.shtml.
 134. See John Markoff, Obama Seeking to Boost Study of Human Brain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/science/project-seeks-to-build-map-of-human-brain 
.html?_r=0. 
 135. Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging 
Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 357 (2010). 
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different focus.136 This Article fills that gap by examining recent 
scientific advances in the study of the brain and mental illness and 
how those advances should illuminate the thorny issue of when to 
forcibly medicate a patient who is severely mentally ill. The Article 
focuses on schizophrenia as an example of “one of the most complex 
of all mental health disorders.”137
A.  Schizophrenia—the Nature and Symptoms of the Disease 
Schizophrenia is a severe brain disorder that affects 
approximately 1 percent of Americans138 and twenty-four million 
people worldwide.139 It is a chronic and often disabling condition 
with no known cure, but treatment may relieve the patient of many 
symptoms.140 Generally schizophrenia manifests itself with paranoid 
delusions and auditory hallucinations either in late adolescence or 
early adulthood, “with a peak between ages [eighteen and twenty-
five], when the prefrontal cortex [an area of the brain] is still 
developing.”141 But there is evidence that it is a neurodevelopmental 
disorder and that psychosis is “a late, potentially preventable stage of 
the illness.”142
Schizophrenia’s effects vary widely, and relapse and remission 
cycles are common.143 The symptoms of schizophrenia are 
categorized as positive, negative, and cognitive. Positive symptoms 
are psychotic behaviors that can wax and wane. They include 
 136.  See, e.g., Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Do Courts 
Continue to Rely on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987 (2002); Rodney 
J.S. Deaton, Neuroscience and the In Corpore-Ted First Amendment, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
181 (2006); Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket”: The Legal Significance 
of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033 
(2002); Rachel A. Scherer, Toward A Twenty-First Century Civil Commitment Statute: A Legal, 
Medical, and Policy Analysis of Preventive Outpatient Treatment, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 361, 
362 (2007). 
 137. Schizophrenia, JOHN HOPKINS MED. HEALTH LIBR., http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org 
/healthlibrary/conditions/mental_health_disorders/schizophrenia_85,P00762/ (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2013). 
 138. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 5. 
 139. Schizophrenia, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mental_health/management 
/schizophrenia/en/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 140. See NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 1. 
 141. Thomas Insel, Rethinking Schizophrenia, 468 NATURE 187, 188 (2010), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v468/n7321/full/nature09552.html. 
 142. Id. at 187. 
 143. Frequently Asked Questions about Schizophrenia, BRAIN & BEHAV. RES. FOUND., http:// 
bbrfoundation.org/frequently-asked-questions-about-schizophrenia (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
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hallucinations (these may involve any of the senses but are most 
often voices), delusions (non-cultural false beliefs that do not yield to 
logic and are often bizarre—examples include believing thoughts can 
kill others, that neighbors are controlling one’s own behavior through 
magnetic waves, radio stations are broadcasting one’s thoughts to 
others, or paranoid delusions that others are conspiring harm), 
thought disorders (often manifested in trouble organizing or 
connecting thoughts logically and may result in garbled speech), and 
movement disorders (sometimes manifested in performing certain 
repeated motions or becoming catatonic).144
Negative symptoms involve loss of function in areas such as 
emotion and motivation. They include flat affect (lack of facial 
expression), talking in a flat voice, lack of ability to feel pleasure or 
begin and sustain planned activities, and social withdrawal.145
Cognitive symptoms include poor executive functioning, 
working memory, focus, or attention. Cognitive symptoms can be 
severely disabling of efforts to lead a normal life.146 “Violence is not 
a symptom of schizophrenia—only a tiny proportion of sufferers 
with the condition are homicidal.”147 People with the disease are 
generally not violent.148 However, there is increased risk as 
compared to the general population, and factors that some claim 
markedly increase the risk of violence include substance abuse and 
acute psychotic symptoms.149 “Research has suggested that those 
with schizophrenia whose psychotic symptoms are controlled are no 
more violent than those without [severe mental illness]. It’s likely 
that treatment not only helps ease the symptoms of mental illness, 
but also curbs the potential for violence as well.”150 While the risk of 
being a victim of violence from a person with schizophrenia is very 
 144. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 3. 
 145. Id.
 146. Id.
 147. Editorial, Combating Schizophrenia, 468 NATURE 133, 133 (2010), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v468/n7321/full/468133a.html. 
 148. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 5. 
 149. Elizabeth Walsh et al., Violence and Schizophrenia: Examining the Evidence, 180 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 490, 490–95 (2002). 
 150. Thomas Insel, Director’s Blog: Understanding Severe Mental Illness, NAT’L INST.
MENTAL HEALTH (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2011/understanding-
severe-mental-illness.shtml. The severely mentally ill are far more often the victims rather than 
perpetrators of violence—they are “11 times more likely to be victims of violent crime than the 
general population.” Id.
35551-lla_47-1 S
heet N
o. 146 S
ide B
      09/23/2014   13:40:53
35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 146 Side B      09/23/2014   13:40:53
C M
Y K
RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 9/1/2014 6:48 PM 
280 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:251 
small, people with the illness commit suicide at a much higher rate 
than the general population. Approximately 10 percent of patients die 
by suicide—most of them young adult males.151
Studies of brains of schizophrenic patients have shown a number 
of differences from those of the general population—including 
altered function of certain neurotransmitters, decreased white and 
gray brain matter, enlarged ventricles,152 “reduced hippocampal and 
cortical volume, abnormal cytoarchitecture, reduced neuronal density 
in superficial cortical layers, decreased neuron size, and reduced 
dendritic abortization and dendritic spine density.”153
While these differences have been documented at population 
levels, there are currently no tests to diagnose schizophrenia in an 
individual.154 However, there are promising studies that suggest such 
tests may be available in the future. For example, a recent study was 
able to distinguish between mentally healthy and schizophrenic 
individuals with 98.3 percent accuracy by using a series of tests that 
detected eye-movement abnormalities associated with the disorder 
that were independent of mental state at the time of testing.155
Until such methods can be further verified and perfected, 
diagnoses today are made by monitoring symptoms over a period of 
time.156 Scientists are currently searching for biomarkers that might 
aid not only with diagnosis but lead to more insight regarding what is 
causing the disease. For example, researchers found that among a 
group of young people identified as at risk for the disease, a subfield 
of the hippocampus was abnormally active in those that did develop 
schizophrenia.157
 151. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 5. 
 152. Editorial, supra note 8, at 9; NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 6. 
 153. Frankie H.F. Lee et al., Disc1 Point Mutations in Mice Affect Development of the 
Cerebral Cortex, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3197–206 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/31/9/3197.full?sid=fbe768b6-e3b7-48bb-82e3-47237bc5e68c. 
 154. New Research to Identify and Treat Schizophrenia Early, N.Y. PRESBYTERIAN HOSP.,
COLUM. U. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://nyp.org/advances/new-research-treat-schizophrenia-early.html. 
 155. Philip J. Benson et al., Simple Viewing Tests Can Detect Eye Movement Abnormalities 
That Distinguish Schizophrenia Cases from Controls with Exceptional Accuracy, 72 BIOLOGICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 716, 716 (2012). 
 156. See Frequently Asked Questions about Schizophrenia, supra note 142. 
 157. New Research to Identify and Treat Schizophrenia Early, supra note 153. 
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1.  Mysterious Causes 
“After a century of studying schizophrenia, the cause of the 
disorder remains unknown.”158 However, there is evidence that 
genetic, environmental, and experiential factors play a part in who 
develops the disease. 
While only 1 percent of the population develops schizophrenia, 
it occurs in 10 percent of those with a first-generation relative who 
suffers from the disease—and the odds increase to 40 to 65 percent 
for an identical twin.159 Scientists believe no single gene causes the 
disease on its own.160 “Genetic risk factors are numerous, with 50 to 
100 gene mutations and variations reported each year as associated 
with schizophrenia.”161
Studies of babies born during a famine (both the Dutch Hunger 
Winter of World War II and the Chinese famine from 1959–61) 
show that they had double the chance of developing schizophrenia 
due to malnutrition in the womb.162 Other “[n]ongenetic risk factors 
include [but are not limited to] infection during fetal life, brain 
injury, an anoxia at birth, trauma in childhood, abuse of street drugs 
and steroids, brain lesions, psychosocial stress, isolation, smoking, 
and excess coffee.”163
Determining the precise causal factors is difficult, because “the 
signs and symptoms are the same, regardless of the cause. They are 
the same whether one has had a brain injury and developed 
schizophrenia, or whether one has smoked too much cannabis and 
developed schizophrenia.”164 This similarity in symptoms has been 
assumed to suggest a common molecular pathway for the disease,165
 158. Insel, supra note 140, at 187. 
 159. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 6. 
 160. Id.
 161. Philip Seeman, All Roads to Schizophrenia Lead to Dopamine Supersensitivity and 
Elevated Dopamine D2High Receptors, 17 CNS NEUROSCIENCE & THERAPEUTICS 118–32 (Apr. 
2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1755-5949.2010.00162.x/full. 
 162. John McGrath et al., Prevention and Schizophrenia—The Role of Dietary Factors, 37 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 272–83 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc 
/articles/PMC3044637/. 
 163. Seeman, supra note 160, at 118. 
 164. Id.
 165. Id. at 118–19. 
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but a very recent study questions whether there is some variation on 
that front among at least a minority of schizophrenic patients.166
2.  Treatments for Schizophrenia 
Because there is no known cure, treatment for schizophrenia 
focuses on managing its symptoms. Currently available drugs can 
serve to quiet the positive symptoms of psychosis (for most, though 
not all, patients) but “fail[] to reverse the development of deficits in 
brain capacity that are most prominently expressed as the negative 
symptoms and cognition impairments.”167 Patients may therefore 
“remain disabled and dysfunctional from deficits in capacities for 
feeling, thinking, working, and caring.”168
Drugs alone, therefore, are generally essential but not sufficient 
for optimal treatment of schizophrenia. Experts recommend that 
patients also undergo regular psychosocial treatment of various 
kinds.169 Patients who do regularly receive such treatment are more 
likely to continue taking their medications and are less likely to 
relapse or be hospitalized.170
Professor Elyn Saks has explained that therapy helps patients on 
numerous levels, including with the ability to (1) identify, cope with, 
or avoid stressors; (2) develop psychological mindedness (by which 
she means stronger observational skills for analyzing what is going 
on in one’s own mind, and thus increased ability to have healthier 
reactions to it); and (3) come to terms with the tremendous blow to 
self-esteem that often accompanies patients’ recognition of their 
severe mental illness. Indeed, Elyn Saks believes that had she 
received either drugs without therapy or therapy without drugs, her 
original prognosis that she would never be able to live independently 
 166. “Our findings suggest that there may be a different molecular mechanism leading to 
schizophrenia in patients who do not respond to anti-psychotic medication. Identifying the precise 
molecular pathway particularly in these patients is of utmost importance and will help inform the 
development of much-needed novel treatments.” Research May Explain Why Some People With 
Schizophrenia Do Not Respond to Treatment, MEDICAL XPRESS (Nov. 29, 2012), http:// 
medicalxpress.com/news/2012-11-people-schizophrenia-treatment.html#jCp (citing Arisme 
Demjaha et al., Dopamine Synthesis Capacity in Patients with Treatment-Resistant 
Schizophrenia, 169 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1203 (Nov. 2012)), available at http:// 
ajp.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=1377137). 
 167. McGlashan, supra note 12, at 902. 
 168. Id.
 169. See NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 26, at 11–13. 
 170. Id.
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(let alone become a distinguished, award-winning professor) would 
have been correct.171
As discussed in further detail below, there are serious limitations 
and risks associated with presently available medications, 
complicating the issue of when it might be appropriate to forcibly 
medicate the severely mentally ill. This Article examines some of the 
current research on potential new treatments—but regarding medical 
treatments for the psychotic symptoms, “[f]rustratingly, the 
effectiveness of medications has stalled.”172 Over the more-than-half 
century these medications have been available, they have advanced 
predominantly “not in their efficacy but in a reduction [though not an 
elimination] of their debilitating side effects.”173
The sections that follow examine scientific research regarding 
the vital importance of early medical intervention for long-term 
prognosis, the serious side effects of medications, and the effects that 
changes in the brain can cause in behavior and personality—and how 
all these factors do (or ought to) influence the involuntary treatment 
debate.
B.  The Medical Significance of Early Treatment 
Extensive research shows that for a psychotic illness like 
schizophrenia, “early identification . . . is paramount and can affect 
long-term outcome.”174 Indeed, “[t]he longer the duration between 
the onset of serious psychosis and treatment, the more likely long-
term disability will result.”175
 171. Charlie Rose: The Mentally Ill Brain, supra note 129. 
 172. Editorial, supra note 8, at 9. 
 173. Id.
 174. See, e.g., Mark Taylor et al., Advances in the Understanding and Challenges Facing the 
Management of First-Episode Schizophrenia, 26 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 3, 3–5 (May 2012), 
available at http://jop.sagepub.com/content/26/5_suppl/3.full#ref-8. 
 175. Christopher Slobogin, Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of Incompetent Defendants to 
Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1523, 1530 n.43 (2012) (citing Max 
Marshall et al., Association Between Duration of Untreated Psychosis and Outcome in Cohorts of 
“First-Episode” Patients: A Systematic Review, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 975 (2005)); 
see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
309 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining that “treatment with antipsychotic medication soon after the onset 
of the illness” is associated with a better prognosis); MARVIN I. HERZ & STEPHEN R. MARDER,
SCHIZOPHRENIA: COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 152 (2002) (“[P]rolonged 
psychotic episodes may be associated with enduring damage”); JEFFREY A. LIEBERMAN ET AL.,
TEXTBOOK OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 356 (2006) (“[M]eta-analysis of 42 research reports from 28 
studies found that shorter duration of untreated psychosis was associated with greater response to 
antipsychotic treatment, including improvement in severity of global psychopathology, positive 
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Thomas McGlashan, a now emeritus professor of psychiatry at 
Yale School of Medicine, explained that from a study he conducted 
of 281 Scandinavian patients, there are indications that an untreated 
psychotic state is itself dangerous to one’s long-term prognosis. “It 
looks like the longer the period of time before treatment, the worse 
off the patients are not only when they come into treatment, but how 
they respond to treatment.”176 He explained: 
Acutely active psychosis is a dangerous mental state, if not 
a medical emergency, because of its aberrant experiences, 
loss of insight, and distortions of judgment. It requires 
immediate treatment, including antipsychotic medication, to 
reduce the danger of such distortions to life and social 
network. The threat of chronically active psychosis is time 
rather than mortality and stigma, time immersed in the 
negative symptoms or cognitive distortions of disorder. If 
prolonged, it may well create deficits that add to severity 
beyond the level ultimately determined by the original brain 
pathophysiology.177
Evidence suggests that “schizophrenia is a progressive brain 
disease.”178 Brain scans show schizophrenia causing loss of grey 
matter—reflecting the (at least presently) irreversible destruction of 
neural synapses.179 Jeffrey Lieberman, Professor of Psychiatry at 
Columbia University, explains that “[t]he whole thrust of early 
intervention is to prevent this loss from occurring.”180
Because of the evidence regarding the importance of early 
intervention for long-term prognosis, the National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH) has funded a research project that is presently 
ongoing to try to develop effective methods of early intervention. 
The project, known as Recovery After an Initial Schizophrenic 
Episode (RAISE), involves two independent research teams, 
symptoms, negative symptoms, and functional outcomes.”) (citations omitted); see also Klein, 
supra note 64, at 394 n.175 (“Early treatment is most likely to be effective.”).  
 176. Earlier Diagnosis of Schizophrenia Improves Results of Treatment, YALE SCH. OF MED.
(Feb. 26, 2004), http://medicine.yale.edu/news/article.aspx?id=3456 (quoting Thomas H. 
McGlashan).
 177. Thomas H. McGlashan, Schizophrenia in Translation: Is Active Psychosis Neurotoxic?,
32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 609, 611–13 (2006), available at http://schizophreniabulletin 
.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/4/609.full. 
 178. Taylor et al., supra note 173, at 3. 
 179. New Research to Identify and Treat Schizophrenia Early, supra note 154. 
 180. Id.
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community clinics across the nation, and treatment models that 
“focus on intervening as soon as possible after the first episode of 
schizophrenia . . . . [and] integrate[] medication, psychosocial 
therapies, family involvement, rehabilitation services, and supported 
employment, all aimed at promoting symptom reduction and 
improving life functioning.”181
Thus, early treatment is linked not only with better outcomes, 
but better response to medications and less irreversible damage to the 
brain. This evidence suggests that the early period of the disease is 
critical, and patient welfare interests weigh most strongly in favor of 
medical intervention during those early years. The same evidence 
would also support long-term autonomy interests in early 
intervention in that the patient’s mental abilities will be better 
preserved and thus allow for a fuller range of personal possibilities 
and choices in the future. 
C.  Safety and Effectiveness of Proposed Treatments 
In Harper, the Supreme Court focused heavily on the serious 
side effects that were possible from antipsychotic drugs in 
determining that there was “no doubt that . . . [Mr. Harper] 
possesse[d] a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted 
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”182
The side effects that concerned the Harper court included “acute 
dystonia, a severe involuntary spasm of the upper body, tongue, 
throat or eyes” (though the trial court found this condition could be 
detected and remedied within minutes by taking the medication 
Cogentin); “akathesia (motor restlessness, often characterized by an 
inability to sit still), neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a relatively 
rare condition which can lead to death from cardiac dysfunction), 
and tardive dyskinesia,” a potentially irreversible neurological 
 181. Recovery After an Initial Schizophrenia Episode (RAISE): A Research Project of the 
NIMH, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia 
/raise/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 182. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (emphasis added). The dissent 
argued that the liberty interest was not only important because of potential side effects of the 
drugs, but also because any “violation of a person’s bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her 
liberty” and “is degrading if it overrides a competent person’s choice to reject a specific form of 
medical treatment.” Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). But neither dissent 
nor majority would argue against the proposition that an invasion of liberty is “particularly 
intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of death or injury.” See id.
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disorder “that is characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable 
movements of various muscles, especially around the face.”183 The 
Court acknowledged that there was conflicting evidence regarding 
the frequency, severity, and reversibility of the tardive dyskinesia 
side effect, but declared that “[a] fair reading of the evidence” 
suggested that 10 percent to 25 percent of patients receiving 
antipsychotic medications exhibited its symptoms—60 percent of 
those that exhibited the symptoms had only “mild or minimal” 
effects and 10 percent had severe symptoms.184
Harper was decided in 1990 and therefore did not focus on the 
atypical or second-generation antipsychotic medications, the first of 
which started to become broadly available in roughly the same time 
period.185 These drugs are generally less likely to have the 
neurological side effects of the first-generation options.186 There is 
especially decreased risk for the side effects of tardive dyskinesia 
and neuroleptic malignant syndrome.187
However, these second-generation drugs continue to carry 
substantial risk of serious negative side effects.188 Depending on the 
 183. Id. at 229–30 (majority opinion). 
 184. Id. at 230. 
 185. Douglas Mossman & Jill L. Steinberg, Promoting, Prescribing, and Pushing Pills: 
Understanding the Lessons of Antipsychotic Drug Litigation, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 263, 
279 (2009). 
 186. MELTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 382; Richard A. Friedman, A Call for Caution on 
Antipsychotic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/health/a 
-call-for-caution-in-the-use-of-antipsychotic-drugs.html?_r=0. At least one recent study has 
called into question whether second-generation drugs really do have clinically significant 
differences in extrapyramidal side effects, but that study’s methods of analysis and conclusions 
have been criticized. See Henk S. Temmingh, Extrapyramidal Side-Effects and Antipsychotics: 
Are Second-Generation Agents Still Indicated?, 201 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 247, 247 (2012), 
available at http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/201/3/247.1.short. The article criticized is Michael J. 
Peluso et al., Extrapyramidal Motor Side-Effects of First- and Second-Generation Antipsychotic 
Drugs, 200 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 387 (Mar. 22, 2012), available at http:// 
bjp.rcpsych.org/content/200/5/387.fall. Another recent study confirms that second-generation 
antipsychotics offer an extrapyramidal side effects advantage over first-generation drugs in first 
episode psychosis. See Peter M Haddad et al., Antipsychotic Drugs and Extrapyramidal Side 
Effects in First Episode Psychosis: A Systemic Review of Head-Head Comparisons,
26 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 15, 24–25 (May 2012), available at http://jop.sagepub.com 
/content/26/5_suppl/15.short.
 187. MELTON ET AL., supra note 29 at 382; Friedman, supra note 186. 
 188. See Christopher Slobogin, supra note 175, at 1542 (“The drugs used to treat psychosis—
including the so-called second-generation atypicals—all can have serious side effects, are 
frequently administered in unnecessarily large doses or are not good drugs for the particular 
person being treated, and are ineffective for anywhere from a quarter to a third of those to whom 
they are administered.”) (citing RICHARD P. BENTALL, DOCTORING THE MIND: IS OUR CURRENT
TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS REALLY ANY GOOD? 222–24 (2009)). 
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specific drug prescribed and the body chemistry of the individual 
patient, these side effects may include increased blood sugar, 
elevated lipids and cholesterol, weight gain, diabetes, diminished 
sexual desire, digestion problems, dizziness, drowsiness, anxiety, 
insomnia, rapid heart rate, and agitation.189 Patients taking clozapine 
(one of the second-generation drugs) also have a small risk of 
developing agranulocytosis, which is potentially fatal.190 Patients 
using clozapine must therefore be monitored by frequent blood 
tests—especially in the first six months of treatment when 
development of agranulocytosis is most likely.191 Second-generation 
drugs are generally “less effective than they could be because over 
time, they turn off a gene that helps reduce symptoms of 
psychosis.”192
Only clozapine has been shown to be significantly more 
effective in controlling psychotic symptoms than other first- or 
second-generation antipsychotic drugs.193 But because of a variety of 
factors, including the cost and inconvenience of frequent blood tests, 
FDA restrictions, and medical risks, the drug is generally prescribed 
only as a final resort when other antipsychotics have proven 
ineffective for the patient.194
Dr. Herbert Meltzer, a prominent expert on antipsychotic 
medications at Northwestern University, has explained that currently 
approximately 70 percent of schizophrenics can be successfully 
treated with antipsychotic medications other than clozapine. Of the 
30 percent untreatable by those drugs, another approximate 70 
percent can be successfully treated by clozapine. Clozapine also 
reduces the risk of suicide for schizophrenic patients by 
 189. MELTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 382. 
 190. Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket,” supra note 136, at 1070–71. 
 191. Id. at 1071. 
 192. Gary Stix, The Grand Challenge of Schizophrenia Drugs, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Sept. 21, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/talking-back/2012/09/21/the-grand-
challenge-of-schizophrenia-drugs/ (summarizing the findings of Steve Hyman, former Harvard 
provost and director of the National Institute of Mental Health). 
 193. See Questions and Answers About the NIMH Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of 
Intervention Effectiveness Study (CATIE)—Phase 2 Results, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH
(Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/trials/practical/catie/phase2results.shtml. 
 194. Mossman, supra note 136, at 1071–73. 
35551-lla_47-1 S
heet N
o. 150 S
ide B
      09/23/2014   13:40:53
35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 150 Side B      09/23/2014   13:40:53
C M
Y K
RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 9/1/2014 6:48 PM 
288 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:251 
approximately 80 percent but can be lethal to roughly one in ten 
thousand patients.195
Thus, medications are unquestionably effective for the large 
majority of patients—but it may take some trial and error to discover 
which drug is the best match for which patient. And for a small 
minority, no drug will effectively treat psychosis. For the latter 
group, clearly patient welfare cannot trump the autonomy concerns. 
Unfortunately, however, there is currently no way to know who falls 
in that small minority before experimenting with different drugs for 
the patient. 
Indeed, scientific studies have made it increasingly clear that 
both side effects and probable consequences of refusing treatment 
are highly variable depending on the individual and the drugs 
involved.196 Thus in determining whether drugs are in a 
schizophrenic person’s best interest or are “medically appropriate,” 
an individualized assessment, including a patient’s medical history 
and consideration of past reactions to specific drugs, is necessary. 
In the near future, it may also be possible to do some relevant 
genetic analysis. For example, two studies published in 2012 found 
“two genetic variants associated with the substantial, rapid weight 
gain occurring in nearly half the patients treated with antipsychotic 
medications.”197 “These results could eventually be used to identify 
which patients have the variations, enabling clinicians to choose 
strategies to prevent this serious side effect and offer more 
personalized treatment.”198
 195. Herbert Meltzer, Address at Psychotropic Medication and the Law Symposium at The 
Saks Institute for Mental Health Law, Policy, and Ethics: Development and Utilization of Drugs 
for Treating Psychotic Disorders (Mar. 22, 2012), video available at http://weblaw.usc.edu 
/centers/saks/psychotropic_medication.cfm. 
 196. See Francis J. McMahon & Thomas R. Insel, Pharmacogenomics and Personalized 
Medicine in Neuropsychiatry, 74 NEURON 773, 773–76 (June 2012), available at http:// 
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089662731200431X. 
 197. Genetic Link to Rapid Weight Gain from Antipsychotics Discovered, THE CENTRE FOR 
ADDICTION AND MENTAL HEALTH (CAMH) (July 17, 2012), http://www.camh.ca/en/hospital 
/about_camh/newsroom/news_releases_media_advisories_and_backgrounders/current_year/Page
s/Genetic-link-to-rapid-weight-gain-from-antipsychotics-discovered.aspx. The studies published 
were: Malhotra AK et al., Association Between Common Variants Near the Melanocortin 4 
Receptor Gene and Severe Antipsychotic Drug-Induced Weight Gain, 69 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY, 904, 904–12 (Sept. 2012); NI Chowdhury et al., Genetic Association Study 
Between Antipsychotic-Induced Weight Gain and the Melanocortin-4 Receptor Gene,
PHARMACOGENOMICS J. (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.nature.com/tpj/journal/vaop 
/ncurrent/full/tpj201166a.html. 
 198. Genetic Link to Rapid Weight Gain from Antipsychotics Discovered , supra note 197. 
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Another study aimed at developing means to assist in the 
prediction of a patient’s response to antipsychotic drugs examined 
magnetic resonance (MR) imaging of patients’ brain structure. The 
study concluded that among patients suffering a first-episode of 
schizophrenia, those that responded well to the tested antipsychotics 
had greater cortical thickness and asymmetry in certain regions of the 
brain. These “findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
plasticity and cortical thickness may be more preserved in responders 
and that MR imaging may assist in the prediction of antipsychotic 
drug response in patients experiencing a first-episode of 
schizophrenia.”199
For the time being, however, finding the appropriate drug for a 
patient generally remains a trial-and-error process that can subject 
the patient to highly undesirable and dangerous side effects. But in 
weighing patient welfare interests in light of those side effects, one 
must also consider the alternative—full-blown psychosis—and likely 
consequences in its wake. A recent study shows that for the large 
majority of schizophrenic patients, the effects of no medication are a 
greater mortal danger to health than the side effects patients may 
understandably wish to avoid. 
That study was conducted by one of the world’s leading 
epidemiologists, Professor Jari Tiihonen, MD. Published in 2009, the 
study examined mortality rates of 66,881 schizophrenic patients. The 
study concluded that “[l]ong-term cumulative exposure (7–11 years) 
to any antipsychotic treatment was associated with lower mortality 
than was no drug use.”200 Therefore, the greatest risk of premature 
death for a schizophrenic patient was not from side effects of 
antipsychotic medications, but from choosing to refrain from any 
antipsychotic medication.201
Thus, although there has not been much progress in developing 
new drugs in the last several decades (and further research in that 
 199. Philip R. Szesko, Magnetic Resonance Imaging Predictors of Treatment Response in 
First-Episode Schizophrenia, 38 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 569, 569 (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals.org/content/38/3/569.short. 
 200. Jari Tiihonen et al., 11-Year Follow-Up of Mortality in Patients with Schizophrenia: A 
Population-Based Cohort Study (FIN11 Study), 374 THE LANCET 620, 620 (Aug. 22, 2009), 
available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(09)60742-X 
/abstract (emphasis added); see also Meltzer, supra note 194 (discussing the Tiihonen article). 
 201. See Tiihonen et al., supra note 200, at 620; Meltzer, supra note 195. 
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area is sorely needed),202 there has been progress in research 
regarding which individuals may be more or less susceptible to the 
side effects of those drugs that are currently available and the 
potential consequences of refusing medication altogether. As Justice 
Kennedy predicted, “[t]he state of our knowledge of antipsychotic 
drugs and their side effects is evolving,”203 and the legal community 
should adjust its analysis as scientific developments surface. For 
now, that would include a highly individualized analysis of a 
patient’s likely response to specified medications (and the likely 
consequence of abstaining) when determining if medication is in the 
patient’s best medical interest—and thus how heavily the patient 
welfare interest should weigh in the balance. Although presently that 
analysis is generally a question of medical history, the science 
suggests that, in the future, there will be other types of analyses that 
will be available to better predict a particular patient’s response to 
specific drugs. While it would seem that generally patient welfare 
would weigh in favor of any patient with severe symptoms of 
schizophrenia being subject to medication, that may not be true in 
cases where all available drugs have proved fruitless or where 
biomarkers might predict particularly severe responses to the 
available drugs.
D.  Personhood 
If autonomy is concerned with protecting the rights and 
freedoms of the individual person, we must have some concept of 
what “personhood” is.204 Mental illness can confuse the personhood 
issue because the sick self and the healthy self may be at odds in 
various ways and in ways that are not always easy to determine.205
Professor Elyn Saks explains that “it is hard to say when a new self 
has come into being (rather than simply being a changed self) and 
 202. “Medication development for mental disorders has stalled over the past three 
decades. . . . Recently, many major pharmaceutical companies have all but abandoned drug 
discovery efforts for mental illness.” McMahon & Insel, supra note 196, at 773. 
 203. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 145 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 204. For a greater discussion of theories of autonomy, see supra Part II.B. 
 205. The differences between the sick self and the healthy self may be more of a shifting 
spectrum than a true dichotomy. 
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when the new self has become the true self or is simply a temporary 
aberration.”206 She concludes: 
Surely a self that is unimpaired is in some sense “better” 
than a self that is impaired. It has more skills and more 
options. Impairments are limitations, and, all else being 
equal, it is better not to suffer limitations. Value choices are 
problematic in some ways, but some value choices seem so 
right and good that we should feel fine about making 
them.207
If we accept the healthy self as the true self (a proposition most 
would probably accept if applying a Rawlsian veil),208 then 
autonomy interests weigh in favor of protecting that self’s choices 
over the impaired self’s choices when the two are in conflict. If the 
healthy self would welcome treatment but the sick self would not, 
autonomy would weigh in favor of forcing treatment—not only 
because it honors the true self’s desires but also because it opens 
options for the individual. The healthy self has far more ability to 
function and prosper than the self that is allowed to remain 
psychotic. However, determining the absent healthy self’s true 
desires may be no easy matter. This section explores the science 
behind various conditions that may cause the impaired self to express 
different desires than the healthy self. 
1.  Anosognosia 
The word “anosognosia” combines the Greek words for disease, 
“nosos,” and knowledge, “gnosis,” literally meaning “to not know a 
disease.”209 It is distinguishable from denial in that the latter is “a 
psychological coping mechanism . . . . [A] defense mechanism that 
protects the individual from distress.”210 By contrast, anosognosia in 
 206. SAKS, supra note 48, at 204. 
 207. Id. at 204–05. 
 208. See generally John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136–37 (1971) (explaining that 
principles of justice are best constructed from behind a veil of ignorance that eliminates 
knowledge of individuating characteristics). In this case I refer to not knowing whether one would 
contract schizophrenia or a similar disease in the future.  
 209. Anosognosia—Frequently Asked Questions, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., http:// 
treatmentadvocacycenter.org/component/content/article/1790. 
 210. Mounir Ouzir et al., Insight in Schizophrenia: From Conceptualization to Neuroscience,
66 PSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 167, 169 (Apr. 2012), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1440-1819.2012.02325.x/full#b2. 
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schizophrenia “has an anatomical basis and is caused by damage to 
the brain by the disease process.”211
A World Health Organization study found that 50 to 80 percent 
of schizophrenic patients worldwide suffered from either partial or 
complete lack of insight into their mental disorder.212 Fifty percent of 
those with schizophrenia in the United States would translate to 
approximately 1.5 million people who lack awareness regarding their 
condition.213 This inability to recognize one’s own illness or aspects 
thereof, also called anosognosia,214 can “occur[] in both 
schizophrenia and right hemisphere lesions [of the brain] due to 
stroke, dementia, and traumatic brain injury.”215 Such “lack of 
insight in schizophrenia appears to be self-specific, as most patients 
recognize symptoms in other patients, but fail to do so in 
themselves. . . . impl[ying] that lack of insight may be caused by 
disturbed abilities of self-referential processing.”216
The consequences of anosognosia for the schizophrenic patient 
can be severe. “Preserved insight into illness has been suggested to 
be predictive of outcome in patients with schizophrenia.”217 Studies 
have associated poor insight in schizophrenia “with defects in 
cognitive functions such as attention, memory, language, executive 
functioning and social cognition . . . poor treatment compliance, poor 
 211. The Anatomical Basis of Anosognosia-Backgrounder, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-reports-and-studies/2143 (last updated 
May 2013). 
 212. Ouzir et al., supra note 210, at 167 (citing WT Carpenter, Jr., et al., Flexible System for 
the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia: Report From the WHO International Pilot Study of 
Schizophrenia, 182 SCI. 1275, 1275–78 (1973)). 
 213. See Celso Arango & Xavier Amador, Lessons Learned About Poor Insight, 37 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 27 (Dec. 2010), available at http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals
.org/content/37/1/27.short#.
 214. “Insight, however, may not be viewed as a simple balance between awareness and 
unawareness of illness. For example, . . . some patients may recognize signs of illness but 
attribute them to causes other than abnormalities in their mental states.” Ouzir et al., supra note 
210, at 168 (citing X.F. Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULL. 113, 113–32 (1991)). 
 215. Philip Gerretsen et al., Frontotemporoparietal Asymmetry and Lack of Illness Awareness 
in Schizophrenia, 34 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 1035, 1035 (May 2013), available at http:// 
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hbm.21490/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&us
erIsAuthenticated=false.
 216. Edith J. Liemburg et al., Reduced Connectivity in the Self-Processing Network of 
Schizophrenia Patients with Poor Insight, 7 PLOS ONE e42707 (2012), http://www.plosone.org 
/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0042707. 
 217. C. Faget-Agius et al., Schizophrenia With Preserved Insight is Associated With 
Increased Perfusion of the Precuneus, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY NEUROSCIENCE 297 (Sept. 2012), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=faget-agius%20schizphrenia%20insight. 
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social and interpersonal functioning, poor prognosis, and higher risk 
of relapse.”218 Additionally, “poor insight may increase the incidence 
of depression, hopelessness, low self-esteem and more generally 
poor quality of life.”219
Multiple studies have also found that lack of insight is 
associated with disorganized symptoms, but not all studies have been 
consistent in their findings in this regard.220 “Disorganization in 
patients with schizophrenia represents the most direct clinical 
expression of mental dissociation and may preclude the capacity to 
engage in abstract thinking needed to reflect rationally on their 
anomalous experiences, leaving the individual with schizophrenia 
without a coherent concept of normality.”221
Furthermore, because patients who deny they are ill often refuse 
medication, they can be subject to all the consequences associated 
with non-adherence to treatment, including “arrest, homelessness, 
hospitalization, violence and similar outcomes. . . . [P]eople who 
know they are sick seek help before their condition becomes dire. 
People who are unaware they are ill do not.”222
While it is undisputed that many schizophrenic patients deny 
they are sick or seem to lack other awareness regarding their disease, 
there is dispute among the scholarly community as to how many of 
these people are in denial and how many (if any) are truly unable (at 
least temporarily) to recognize their illness due to anosognosia.223
One study concluded that “the weakness of the existing relationship 
between insight and severity of symptomatology on the one hand, 
and between insight and emotional state on the other hand, suggests 
 218.  Ouzir et al., supra note 208, at 167.  
 219. Id. However, the studies are not all consistent. For example, some studies have linked 
good insight with more severe depression or greater suicide risk, while other studies have found 
no such correlation; see id. at 172. 
 220. Id. at 168. 
 221. Id.
 222. Why We Talk about Anosognosia, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/69-no-state/2142-why-we-talk-about 
-anosognosia.
 223. See, e.g., SAKS, supra note 48, at 242 n.30 (“Whether we should think of denial as an 
understandable psychological defense or as a symptom of an illness is unclear. . . . Some 
commentators . . . make much of the idea that denial may have neurophysiological correlates. But 
surely everything mental does, so I’m not sure how far this observation takes us.”); E. Fuller 
Torrey, Anosognosia, Denial and the New Antipsychiatry, TREATMENT ADVOC. CENTER (Oct. 
2012), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/problem/anosognosia/2178#torrey-response. . 
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that both psychodynamic [denial] and clinical [anosognosia] models 
are not sufficient explanatory models.”224
But there is continually mounting evidence that lack of 
awareness is associated with abnormalities in the brain of 
schizophrenic patients and thus may not be simply due to normal 
coping mechanisms. Two decades ago there were approximately ten 
empirical studies on the lack of insight into illness in schizophrenic 
patients, whereas now there are hundreds.225 Some of the most recent 
studies regarding the relationship of poor insight into illness in 
schizophrenia and defects in the brain have included the following 
findings:
“[There is] a relationship between anosognosia and 
hemispheric asymmetry in schizophrenia, supporting 
previous volume-based MRI studies in schizophrenia that 
found a relationship between illness unawareness and 
reduced right hemisphere gray matter volume.”226
“[There is] a link between known regional brain abnormalities 
[in the cortical midline structures and the frontopolar cortex] 
and the manifestation of poor insight in schizophrenia.”227
“[S]chizophrenia with preserved insight is associated with 
greater [cerebral blood flow in] the precuneus, a brain area 
known to be involved in self-consciousness, suggesting a 
compensatory mechanism of fronto-temporal impairment.”228
“[S]chizophrenia patients with relatively preserved insight 
showed stronger connectivity than patients with poor insight 
in the anterior cingulated cortex and precuneus, both key 
regions in self-reflective processing. These findings 
tentatively support the hypothesis that poor insight may be 
related to impaired self-related processing.”229
 224. Ouzir et al., supra note 210, at 169. 
 225. Arango & Amador, supra note 213, at 27. 
 226. Gerretsen et al., supra note 215, at 1035. 
 227. Tuukka T. Raij et al., Association of Poor Insight in Schizophrenia With Structure and 
Function of Cortical Midline Structures and Frontopolar Cortex, 139 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 27, 
27 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22664168. 
 228. Faget-Agius et al., supra note 217, at 297. 
 229. Liemburg et al., supra note 216, at 6. 
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“Impaired insight in schizophrenia implicates a complex 
neural circuitry: white matter deficits in fronto-temporo brain 
regions are linked to symptom unawareness; compromised 
temporal and parietal white matter regions are involved in the 
misattribution of symptoms. These findings suggest the 
multidimensional construct of insight has multiple neural 
determinants.”230
“[P]oorer awareness of illness was associated with regional 
[cortical] thinning in the left middle frontal and inferior 
temporal gyri. Poorer awareness of treatment need and 
efficacy was associated with cortical thinning in the left 
medial frontal gyrus, precuneus and temporal gyri. . . . The 
results confirm predictions derived from the anosognosia . . . 
account and assert that regional thickness in frontal cortex is 
associated with awareness of illness in the early phase of 
psychosis . . . . [The study also] suggests that the neural 
signature of insight involves a network of brain structures, 
and not only the frontal lobes as previously suggested.”231
Other studies have found a relationship between poor insight in 
schizophrenic patients and “reduced total brain volume, ventricular 
enlargement, frontal lobe atrophy, reduced frontal lobe volume, and 
gray matter deficits” in various regions of the brain.232 But not all 
studies are consistent in their findings. 
Other studies . . .  have not found any significant 
correlations between lack of insight and total brain volume, 
total ventricular volume and gray or white matter volumes 
in the prefrontal region. This inconsistency could arise from 
the complex nature of insight and the use of a variety of 
insight assessments.233
 230. Daniel Antonius et al., White Matter Integrity and Lack of Insight in Schizophrenia and 
Schizoaffective Disorder, 128 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 76, 77 (May 2011), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21429714. 
 231. Lisa Buchy et al., Cortical Thickness Is Associated With Poor Insight in First-Episode 
Psychosis, 45 J. PSYCHIATRY RES. 781, 781 (June 2011), available at http:// 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21092987. 
 232. Ouzir, supra note 210, at 174. 
 233. Id.
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The American Psychiatric Association’s official classification of 
mental disorders contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) undertook a revision of its section on 
schizophrenia in 2000 to reflect emerging scientific consensus.234
Even though less evidence was available over a decade ago, the 
DSM sided with anosognosia over denial. The relevant provision 
states:
A majority of individuals with schizophrenia have poor 
insight regarding the fact that they have a psychotic illness. 
Evidence suggests that poor insight is a manifestation of the 
illness rather than a coping strategy. It may be comparable 
to the lack of awareness of neurological deficits seen in 
stroke, termed anosognosia. This symptom predisposes the 
individual to noncompliance with treatment and has been 
found to be predictive of higher relapse rates, increased 
number of involuntary hospital admissions, poorer 
psychosocial functioning, and poorer course of illness.235
The implications of anosognosia to the involuntary treatment 
debate are manifold. “For example, can a person truly give informed 
consent for treatment of an illness that he cannot see? How is legal 
competency affected? What should state laws, policies and resources 
look like in addressing this?”236
If we believe a mentally ill person has the capacity to make an 
informed, rational decision regarding refusing medication, there is a 
greater natural tendency to respect the choice (even if it is a decision 
we don’t believe is in the patient’s best interest) as a valid exercise of 
agency and civil rights. But if we believe there is brain damage from 
the schizophrenia that impairs the patient’s ability to make an 
informed, rational choice, it drastically changes the equation. We are 
no longer respecting a person’s informed choice, rather we are 
protecting an inadequately informed delusion.237 And if patients 
cannot recognize their illness, and medication is in their best 
interests, it is not clear that their autonomy interests should weigh 
 234. Arango & Amador, supra note 213, at 27. 
 235. Id. (quoting DSM-IV 304 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n Press, 2000)). 
 236. David Hager, “Anosognosia Is Blindness”—Personally Speaking, TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CTR. (2011), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-blog/69-no-
state/2083-anosognosia-is-blindness-personally-speaking. 
 237. See Torrey, supra note 223. 
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supreme—for perhaps if they could recognize the illness, they would 
accept treatment. 
Professor Elyn Saks argues that even if the reasons for denial are 
illness-based (which she does not concede), this “is no reason for not 
respecting the choices based on them. . . . . Respecting autonomy is 
extremely important, and we demonstrate our commitment to it when 
we respect the autonomy of those whose decision-making is 
somewhat (though not grossly) compromised.”238
In response, I argue that not knowing one is ill is a “gross 
impairment” when the decision is whether to take medication. If you 
do not believe you are ill, it would never make sense to take these 
powerful brain-altering medications. Indeed, at least one study has 
shown that the most common reason for individuals with severe 
psychiatric disorders to not take their medication was that they did 
not believe they were ill.239 Other studies have usually found a strong 
association between the two.240
2.  Potential Effects of Changes in Brain Chemistry 
or Structure on Personality and Choices 
 There are now many documented examples of how a 
person’s personality and choices may be changed when a 
person’s brain is altered by injury or illness. David Eagleman, a 
renowned neuroscientist, has explained that even slight changes 
in one’s brain chemistry can cause large changes in behavior.241
Such changes highlight the complexity of the autonomy issue 
when trying to distinguish the “real” self from the self whose 
 238. SAKS, supra note 48, at 108. 
 239. Why Individuals With Severe Psychiatric Disorders Often Do Not Take Their 
Medications-Backgrounder, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. (Apr. 2011), http:// 
treatmentadvocacycenter.org/resources/consequences-of-lack-of-treatment/anosognosia/1375-
why-individuals-with-severe-psychiatric-disorders-often-do-not-take-their-medications (citing 
Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness, 36 
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 987, 996 (2001)). 
 240. See id. But while “[t]he majority of studies support the assumption that insight is 
associated with adherence during treatment phase . . . the association with long-term adherence 
remains unclear. Insight correlates with better long-term functioning, but this might be explained 
by its association with symptoms.” Tania M. Lincoln et al., Correlates and Long-Term 
Consequences of Poor Insight in Patients With Schizophrenia. A Systematic Review, 33 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1324, 1324 (2007), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed 
/17289653?dopt=Abstract. 
 241. EAGLEMAN, supra note 127, at 157. 
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choices may be affected by mental illness. 
 In the case of a severe mental illness like schizophrenia, the 
symptoms can clearly change the perceptions and thought processes 
of the individual—even when not rendering a person irrational. A 
relatively new field known as “decision neuroscience” studies what 
happens in human brains during decision making and endeavors to 
map thinking on a cellular level.242 One expert in the field, C. Daniel 
Salzman at Columbia University School of Medicine, explained that 
for many psychiatric disorders, patients that are 
symptomatic are frequently making poor decisions about 
numerous things throughout the day . . . . If you’ve ever had 
a friend or family member with depression, you can see 
they are not making decisions the way they normally do. So 
there clearly has to be dysfunction in the neurocircuits of 
psychiatric patients affecting their decisions.243
One study of the decision-making process of schizophrenic 
patients found that those “with prominent positive symptoms were 
unable to feel regret, and to learn from what they could have 
obtained with a different choice. This impairment contributes 
strongly to the inability of these patients to generate adaptive 
behavior in individual and social environments.”244 However, other 
schizophrenic patients without the prominent positive symptoms 
reacted similarly to the healthy controls in the study except that they 
exhibited more risk-seeking behavior.245
Of course none of this necessarily indicates that the healthy self 
would prefer medication when the unhealthy self refuses. But these 
examples do suggest that there can be significant differences in the 
expressed desires and choices of the two selves due to the illness. 
These examples also suggest that, though not always rising to the 
level of incompetence, these individuals’ decision-making process 
may be impaired by disease. This Article does not take the position 
that society should thus disregard the decisions and desires of the 
 242. The Neuroscience of Decision Making, THE KAVLI FOUND. (Aug. 2011), http://www 
.kavlifoundation.org/science-spotlights/neuroscience-of-decision-making.
 243. Quoted in The Neuroscience of Decision Making, supra note 242 (emphasis added). 
 244. Marion Larquet et al., Impaired Decision Making in Schizophrenia and Orbitofrontal 
Cortex Lesion Patients, 116 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 266, 272 (2010), available at http:// 
dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/472/docs/Larquet_Coricelli_Schizophrenia_Research_2010.pdf. 
 245. Id. at 271. 
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severely mentally ill. But it does argue that under some 
circumstances this may be justification for weighing autonomy 
interests (insofar as they relate to the desires expressed by the ill 
individual) less strongly than for those with illnesses that do not 
target the brain in the same degree. 
IV. PROPOSED REFORM
A.  Finding the Proper Balance 
How should all these scientific insights influence finding the 
proper balance between autonomy and patient welfare? In terms of 
patient welfare, weighing on the side of forcible intervention is not 
just the patient’s suffering, but also the vital importance of early 
treatment, without which irreversible damage may occur and  
long-term prognosis worsens. Early treatment may also prevent 
suicide (certainly clozapine has been shown to be very effective in 
doing so)—and suicide is a substantial risk for schizophrenia 
patients, especially in early years.246
Although patient welfare initially seems to weigh against forced 
treatment when one considers the serious potential side effects of the 
current antipsychotic drugs, the emerging science suggests that, even 
if better drugs are not on the immediate horizon, more and more 
individualized analysis will be possible to determine which patients 
will have which reactions to which drugs. Thus, there will be greater 
capacity to tailor treatment in ways that minimize serious side 
effects. And a patient-welfare analysis cannot be complete without 
evaluating the severity of the case, and thus whether the side effects 
are a better or worse condition than the untreated disease for the 
patient. In cases of severe psychosis, there is broad-based consensus 
that the best outcomes generally come from consistent medication 
coupled with counseling.247
Then there are issues of autonomy. When should a patient be 
able to decide for himself whether the untreated disease is better or 
worse than taking medications? Or simply that he or she wants to 
refuse them on different bases? Some have objected to involuntary 
 246. Brian A. Palmer et al., The Lifetime Risk of Suicide in Schizophrenia: A Reexamination,
62 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 247, 250 (2005), available at http://archpsyc.jamanetwork 
.com/article.aspx?articleid=208392. 
 247. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
35551-lla_47-1 S
heet N
o. 156 S
ide B
      09/23/2014   13:40:53
35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 156 Side B      09/23/2014   13:40:53
C M
Y K
RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 9/1/2014 6:48 PM 
300 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:251 
treatment on the grounds that outside the context of mental illness 
society generally allows people to refuse medication if they wish, 
even for what most might consider irrational reasons.248 Is there 
something fundamentally different about mental illness that should 
overcome an equal protection argument of that kind? 
There are fundamental differences because of the way changes 
in brain chemistry and structure can change personality and decision-
making, and even change one’s ability to recognize one’s own 
disease. The fundamental difference is that with the severely 
mentally ill, their illness targets and may drastically affect the 
necessary organ for decision-making. A person may still appear 
competent in a technical sense (with the ability to reason at least at 
some level), while making dramatically different decisions than the 
person would have made before illness or injury or chemical changes 
affected the brain. 
But even if one is willing to accept the healthy self as the true 
self whose wishes ought to be respected (not a position all accept, 
but one this Article assumes is correct), how can one determine what 
the healthy self would have wanted? For perhaps both sick and 
healthy self would agree that the medications are undesirable 
regardless of the physical consequences of refusing treatment. 
Severely mentally ill people may have rational reasons for refusing 
medication. 
Elyn Saks has explained that mentally ill patients’ rational 
reasons for refusing medication (not necessarily wise ones—but 
reasons that are not based on delusions or hallucinations) generally 
fall within one of five categories: (1) concerns regarding side effects 
(not only the possible physical and mental side effects previously 
discussed, but also the attendant stigma of visible side effects for 
conditions such as movement disorders); (2) some patients may 
prefer the mentally ill state due to factors such as the bleakness of 
reality and relief of pain that may come with active psychosis, the 
care and attention it fosters from others, identifying the illness with 
one’s true self, or a desire to punish oneself; (3) a “desire to avoid 
narcissistic injury,” which is “[r]ationalized as a belief that one 
shouldn’t rely on crutches” or “as a desire to improve on one’s own;” 
(4) denial; and (5) reactivity—meaning the patient may use refusal of 
 248. See, e.g., SAKS, supra note 48, at 86. 
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the medication as bargaining power, a vent for negative emotions, or 
to control caregivers in some way.249
She argues that with the exception of side effect concerns that 
may be moderated by actual experience with the drugs, the rest of 
these concerns may not necessarily change after a round of forced 
medication.250 Indeed, forcible medication may exacerbate some of 
these objections. While she agrees that the severely mentally ill are 
generally better off when they take their medications willingly, she 
thinks it too great an affront to autonomy to disregard such rational 
refusals under most circumstances. Instead she supports therapeutic 
efforts to try to help patients accept treatment willingly.251
Professor Christopher Slobogin likewise would define 
competence broadly in order to respect most patients’ treatment 
decisions despite the potential existence of significant pathology. He 
advocates the “basic rationality and self-regard standard,” according 
to which a “person should have to understand the relevant facts, be 
free of any fixed, false beliefs about those facts, and be willing to 
exercise decision-making authority.”252
The positions of Saks and Slobogin gain significant support 
from evidence that consensual treatment is generally more effective 
than forced treatment for mentally ill patients.253 The evidence that 
medication accompanied by therapy is far more successful than 
either of those approaches alone also supports the theory, because 
therapy requires a greater degree of mental compliance than does an 
injection of antipsychotics. Furthermore, Slobogin explains that the 
pragmatists among us should note that “psychiatric treatments are 
not always effective and carry significant risks; . . . experiencing 
decompensation may trigger the necessary motivation to try 
treatment; . . . lifelong medication is . . . a very expensive 
proposition; . . . some untreatable people who are presently in 
hospitals should not be there,” and that “a robust right to refuse 
 249. Id. at 97. 
 250. Id. at 96. 
 251. Id.
 252. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 233–34 (2006). Slobogin explains that “the ultimate 
inquiry should focus on the extent to which the person believes ‘facts’ for which there is no 
evidence . . . .” Id. at 244. 
 253. SAKS, supra note 48, at 236 n.8. 
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encourages dialogue between doctor and patient that is all too rare 
when the patient is mentally disabled.”254
Given these ambiguities and tensions between autonomy and 
patient welfare, the proper standard for involuntary treatment cannot 
entirely favor one interest over the other. Society already recognizes 
a justification for involuntary treatment in some situations of danger 
and incompetence. But those terms are generally so severely defined 
that they do not justify involuntary treatment for people who are 
actively and severely psychotic and clearly not reasoning in a normal 
fashion. Mike Earley is an illustrative example—someone who was 
so sick that he broke into a house to have a bubble bath and wrapped 
tinfoil around his head to keep people in the TV from reading his 
thoughts—and yet his father could not get him committed or 
involuntarily treated until his father lied about Mike having 
threatened his father’s life.255 One doctor judged Mike’s competence 
by such facts as Mike’s ability to name the president of the United 
States and count backwards by sevens, despite recognizing his “odd” 
behavior.256 This example also demonstrates the issue of external 
costs to society when psychotic patients refuse treatment. Such costs 
are not limited to physical violence and may be of a fundamentally 
different nature than the costs associated with those who refuse 
treatment for other types of physical illness. 
B.  A New Standard: Widening the Safety Net to Match Current Data 
The new standard I propose to add to existing involuntary 
treatment laws is that (1) if a person is suffering from a severe 
psychotic episode, (2) earnest efforts have been made to convince the 
patient to voluntarily take medication—including discussion 
regarding why the patient objects and possible alternatives that could 
meet those concerns, (3) and medication is in their best medical 
interest, then (4) involuntary treatment should be allowed at least 
during the first two years of treated illness (measured from the first 
date of treatment following a severe psychotic break) or age twenty-
seven, whichever is later. I would also require that therapy be offered 
as a companion to antipsychotic drugs due to the evidence that both 
 254. SLOBOGIN, supra note 252, at 245. 
 255. See EARLEY, supra note 13, at 20–21 
 256. Id. at 14–15, 21–25. 
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are necessary for optimal outcomes, and I would allow the 
involuntary medication to continue so long as deemed necessary 
under the current best medical evidence to provide mental stability. I 
would also require that the medication be offered under an outpatient 
program if that is deemed possible—thus the patient could remain in 
the community so long as he or she continued to comply with the 
medication and counseling order. If a person were forcibly medicated 
under this provision, I would also allow an exception to the privacy 
laws regarding medical records for adult immediate family members 
or other primary caregivers—so long as they could demonstrate that 
they have the best interests of the patient in mind and will participate 
in an approved education program tailored to supporting someone 
with the patient’s condition. A patient could contest that exception 
and be represented by counsel in doing so. 
Why two years and why age twenty-seven? The rationale for 
twenty-seven years is that psychotic breaks for a disease like 
schizophrenia peak from eighteen to twenty-five—when the brain is 
still maturing.257 This period seems to be a crucial one in brain 
development and manifestation of the disease. Putting the age at 
twenty-seven would ensure both that patients can be medicated 
during the crucial period of brain maturation and that all who have 
their first psychotic break within the peak period will have at least 
two years of leeway for getting needed treatment when their 
symptoms become severe. Because treatment in the initial years of 
illness is so critical to long term prognosis and prevention of 
irreversible injury—I would allow the two years from whenever a 
patient first begins being treated for severe psychosis—even if it is 
after age twenty-seven. 
But drawing lines in shifting sand is always difficult. Both the 
two-year and age-twenty-seven limits may need to be revised as 
research progresses. For example, given that men tend to develop 
schizophrenia earlier than women (age 15–24 for men as compared 
to age 25–34 for women),258 perhaps science will reveal a basis for 
creating different involuntary treatment standards for the two 
genders. In the future, science may also be better able to distinguish 
between the effects of psychosis on the brain as caused by different 
 257. See Insel, supra note 141, at 188. 
 258. Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides 
/disease/schizophrenia/risk-factors.html (last visited February 5, 2014) 
35551-lla_47-1 S
heet N
o. 158 S
ide B
      09/23/2014   13:40:53
35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 158 Side B      09/23/2014   13:40:53
C M
Y K
RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 9/1/2014 6:48 PM 
304 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:251 
diseases (or different stages of disease) on the psychotic spectrum,259
which might also require creation of multiple involuntary treatment 
standards or other refinements. 
It is important to note that the time limits in the proposed 
standard are not meant to override other laws that allow for 
involuntary treatment under different circumstances in various 
states—for example laws based on dangerousness or an assessment 
of likely deterioration based on past experience. This standard would 
simply serve as an additional tool for early intervention. 
Why choose these time limits rather than simply adhering to a 
previously proposed reform that would allow “one free shot” of 
involuntary treatment for first-time, serious psychoses if medication 
is likely to be of benefit?260 Professor Elyn Saks stresses that this 
“one shot” standard would allow a patient to experience the benefits 
of medication and thus have a fuller understanding of the choice to 
accept or refuse medication in the future.261 Another author supports 
a similar standard because: 
(1) it would soften the trauma of a first episode, assisting 
families in their attempts to intervene before their loved 
ones’ lives are in complete disarray and their episodes 
escalate to the point of violence; (2) it would expand access 
to early, effective treatment, which gives individuals 
experiencing their first major episodes the best chance for a 
healthy long-term prognosis; and (3) it would cut down 
health care costs paid by government programs.262
While the “one shot” standard is preferable to the present status 
of the law, it still overemphasizes immediate autonomy at the 
expense of both long-term autonomy and patient welfare. It would 
still allow a clearly psychotic individual whose reasoning capacity is 
unquestionably affected by illness to refuse medication despite it 
 259. See Diagnosis and Interventions, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/First_Episode/Diagnosis_and_Interventions.htm 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2014).  
 260. See SAKS, supra note 48, at 89–90; Adam G. Gerhardstein, Comment, A First Episode 
Standard for Involuntary Treatment, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 469. (Gerhardstein’s definition of the 
standard is different in some minor respects); Winick et al., supra note 113, at 99. 
 261. SAKS, supra note 48, at 89–90. Elyn Saks also proposes that, once stabilized by the 
medications, patients should be free to “self-bind”—commit to whether they want medication 
forcibly applied in the future if they are in a psychotic state. Id. at 91. 
 262. Gerhardstein, supra note 260, at 2. 
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being in his or her best medical interest—so long as the “one free 
shot” had been spent. It makes no prolonged exception for the early 
years of the illness when studies show treatment is vital to long-term 
outcome and the suicide risk is highest. Indeed, suicide is over three 
times more likely at the earliest stages of schizophrenia.263
Autonomy does not lose all weight under the circumstances of 
severe and active psychoses. Patients experiencing such episodes 
have not lost their humanity or their consequent need to be valued, 
heard, and respected. Indeed, the new standard reflects this respect 
for human dignity and autonomy in requiring that forced medication 
never be administered absent earnest efforts to first convince a 
patient to voluntarily comply—including exploring why the patient is 
resistant and whether there are alternatives that could address those 
concerns. This provision of the standard is also meant to address the 
research showing that people who voluntarily comply with treatment 
tend to respond better than those forcibly treated.264
But the hope that efforts to reason with severely psychotic 
patients would be adequately successful in convincing the severely 
mentally ill to continue taking medications that are necessary for 
their health and ability to function in society is clearly a fallacy. A 
recent study has shown that “[w]hen patients with schizophrenia 
discontinue oral antipsychotic therapy soon after initiation, as is 
common, chances are not good that they will become adherent to the 
therapy later in their illness.”265 Dr. Bruce J. Wong from the 
University of Pennsylvania, who presented the study at the 2012 U.S. 
Psychiatric and Mental Health Congress, explained that “[e]arly 
noncompliance begets later noncompliance— . . . so if you’re going 
to manage compliance, manage it early . . . . There are many 
suggestions for fostering compliance in the literature, but none are 
very successful.”266 Results from the CATIE study show that up to 
74 percent of schizophrenic patients discontinue medication soon 
after initiation.267
 263. See Palmer et al., supra note 246. 
 264. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 252, at 245 (citing Richard Rogers and Christopher 
Webster, Assessing Treatability in Mentally Disordered Offenders, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19,
20 21 (1989)). 
 265. Nancy A. Melville, Noncompliance With Schizophrenia Therapy Usually Persists,
MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/774271. 
 266. Id.
 267. Id.
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Given these statistics, having the medications administered once 
forcibly is not likely to adequately address the problem of 
noncompliance and its effects. In making policies regarding 
treatment, society cannot ignore the scientific evidence that 
“recurrent psychotic episodes correlate with brain tissue loss in the 
frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes, and with worsening treatment 
response.”268 Couple this with the fact that a person’s judgment is 
inevitably impaired by severe and active psychosis, and that a 
symptom of the disease may be to not have insight that one is sick at 
all, it would seem that patient welfare should outweigh immediate 
autonomy interests during severe psychosis, at least under some 
circumstances. 
The privacy waiver also protects patient welfare interests. The 
support a patient receives from family and loved ones can be critical 
to recovery. Indeed, research has shown that when families receive 
specialized education and training directed at helping them 
understand the patient’s illness and how to offer support, outcomes 
improve for patients on multiple levels. 
Published clinical trials have provided consistent evidence 
on family interventions reducing psychotic relapses, having 
a positive effect on family relationships and reducing 
overall costs of care . . . . Recent meta-analyses have 
confirmed that . . . family interventions reduce patients’ 
relapse rate and hospital admissions, improve patients’ 
compliance to antipsychotic drug treatments, and improve 
social impairment . . . .269
 268. Jeffrey A. Lieberman, The Case for Early Psychosis Intervention, 2007 Annual Sessions 
of the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, May 22, 2007. See summary: Randall, F. White, Medscape 
Perspectives on the 2007 Annual Sessions of the American Psychiatric Association: May 22, 
2007, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (May 23, 2007), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/557112.
 269. Tomas, supra note 10, at 588; see also M. Giron et al., Efficacy and Effectiveness of 
Individual Family Intervention on Social and Clinical Functioning and Family Burden in Severe 
Schizophrenia: A 2-Year Randomized Controlled Study, 40 PSYCHOL. MED. 73 (2010), available
at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6778348 (“Family 
intervention was associated with fewer clinical relapses, hospitalizations and major incidents, and 
an improvement in positive and negative symptoms, social role performance, social relations, 
employment and family burden. . . . Family intervention is effective in severe schizophrenia 
independently of compliance and prognostic factors.”); Thomas C. Jewell et al., Partnering With 
Families: Multiple Family Group Psychoeducation for Schizophrenia, 65 J. OF CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 868 (Aug. 2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002 
/jclp.20610/abstract (discussing family intervention as an effective means of reducing relapses 
and rehospitalization, especially when families are trained about the mental disorder and ways to 
35551-lla_47-1 S
heet N
o. 160 S
ide A
      09/23/2014   13:40:53
35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 160 Side A      09/23/2014   13:40:53
C M
Y K
RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 9/1/2014 6:48 PM 
Fall 2013] A RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? 307 
But privacy laws often act as a barrier to family members or 
other primary caregivers from understanding what is occurring or 
how best to help. To account for rare cases where there are malicious 
intentions in seeking private medical information, I would allow the 
patient to contest such waivers. 
Factors that would protect against unnecessary encroachment on 
autonomy in this standard include (1) time limits, (2) the fact that the 
psychotic episode would have to be severe, and (3) that the 
intervention would have to be in the patient’s best medical interest. 
This latter point would require individualized analysis about the 
potential effects of specific medications upon the patient at hand, 
given both the patient’s medical history and the current research 
regarding biomarkers and likely reactions to specific drugs. The 
patient would have to be given a drug that achieves an appropriate 
balance between likely effectiveness and potential side effects. If an 
acceptable balance could not be achieved—if, for example, all 
available drugs had been tried in the past without effect—then the 
patient’s refusal should be honored. 
There are multiple problems this standard addresses that are not 
met by the “one free shot” method. First, patients often hope and/or 
believe (rightly or wrongly) that they will not revert to psychosis if 
they go off their medications. Thus, the fact that patients stop their 
medication does not necessarily mean that they have decided while 
in their “right mind” that they do not want medication if the 
psychosis resurfaces. They may have wanted that help if psychosis 
recurred—but the psychosis itself may alter the decision they make 
in the moment of crisis.270 Second, the process of finding an effective 
be supportive throughout the recovery process); Insel, supra note 141 (“[A]n aggressive focus on 
cognition along with family support may prove surprisingly effective for preempting or 
forestalling psychosis.”). 
 270. This brings up the issue of self-binding while mentally stable, which Elyn Saks supports. 
See SAKS, supra note 47, at 91. I do not include such a provision in this standard partly because it 
would not allow actively psychotic individuals who had self-bound to no medication to change 
their minds. To not allow a patient to choose what is in the patient’s best medical interest at any 
point seems unconscionable. I understand the logic of respecting the mentally stable choices—
especially when the psychotic condition is congruent with incompetency. But given the 
complexity of the brain and all that science both does and does not understand about what may be 
affecting a severely mentally ill person’s choices, it seems there are insufficient scientific or 
moral grounds for ever barring medication from a person who clearly needs it and expresses a 
desire for it. Self-binding in favor of medication (so long as that remains in the patient’s best 
medical interest) would be acceptable as it does not raise the same concerns. This topic may be 
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drug for a specific patient is currently often a trial-and-error process. 
Therefore, the fact that a patient is unsatisfied with the effect of one 
drug does not mean the patient could not find a satisfactory balance 
between effectiveness and side effects with a different antipsychotic. 
Third, a patient may be refusing drugs on the irrational and false 
basis of not believing he or she is sick due to anosognosia. Fourth, if 
psychotic episodes are permanently damaging the brain in ever 
increasing proportions, allowing patients to refuse help will be 
severely limiting the range of freedom to make autonomous choices 
in the future. 
V. OVERCOMING POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
As explained previously, a constitutional right to refuse has been 
argued on multiple grounds.271 This section will not attempt to 
address every possible constitutional attack of this proposed 
standard, but will address some of the principal arguments that could 
be made. An underlying assumption derived from the scientific 
evidence previously discussed in this Article is that a psychotic 
break, in and of itself, does constitute a significant “danger to self” 
and thus provides at least one of the valid interests in intervention.272
The patient’s “grave disability” or “need for treatment” are arguably 
other such interests.273
A.  Liberty Interest 
As discussed earlier in this Article, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Constitution as protecting a liberty interest in refusing 
antipsychotic drugs—but that liberty is not absolute. Other interests 
can override it, and the strength of the liberty interest was influenced 
worthy of its own article as advanced directives have increased in popularity across a variety of 
circumstances.
 271. See MELTON et al., supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Mossman, supra note 
136, at 1129–38 (explaining how courts have held that the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, along with the Right of Privacy, ensure a right to refuse). 
 272. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225–26 (1990) (upholding a policy that 
allowed forced medication in a prison environment if the prisoner was a danger to self or others); 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (identifying dangerousness as one of the key 
factors in determining whether involuntary commitment is justified). 
 273. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 225–26; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 618 (1979) 
(suggesting that “need for treatment” may be a sufficient interest to overcome liberty interests in 
the context of minor children institutionalized by their parents or guardians). 
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by the severity of the possible side effects in Harper—a case that 
was heard before second-generation drugs were widely used.274
An interesting example of a court weighing the side effects in 
terms of a liberty interest occurred in the case involving Jared 
Loughner, the man who shot former Representative Giffords, killed 
six, and wounded twelve others in Tucson in 2011.275 In an order that 
same year from the Ninth Circuit, reviewing the district court’s 
decision to continue Loughner’s involuntarily treatment, the court 
initially ignored second-generation advances in psychotic drugs.276 It 
cited Harper as authority for the fact that side effects can be fatal, 
and such side effects were one of the factors that the court relied on 
in barring involuntary treatment, at least temporarily.277 But a later 
opinion in the same case allowed involuntary treatment and noted 
that:
[S]ome of the Court’s concerns in Harper have been 
lessened to some extent by significant pharmacological 
advances. . . . [T]he frequency of tardive dyskinesia is a 
fifth or one-tenth of what it was before; neuroleptic 
malignant syndrome is vanishingly rare; extrapyramidal 
effects (Parkinson-like disorders) that had an incidence rate 
of 75 [percent] with Haldol occur very rarely, at the same 
level as with a placebo; and akathisia is also markedly less 
frequent.278
While the less serious side effects of second-generation 
antipsychotics and the apparently upcoming advances in 
personalizing treatment do not eliminate the liberty interest in 
refusing medication, they do somewhat reduce its gravity. And cases 
from the Supreme Court have continually made room for the fact that 
an “overriding justification”279 may overcome a person’s liberty 
interest to refuse medication (even when first-generation drugs are 
 274. See Harper, 494 U.S. 210. 
 275. Michael Muskal, Jared Loughner Sentenced to Life in Tucson Mass Shooting, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/08/nation/la-na-nn-jared-loughner-life-
in-prison-20121108.
 276. United States v. Loughner, No. 11-10339, 2011 WL 2694294, at *1–2 (9th Cir. July 12, 
2011) (order “enjoining the Bureau of Prisons from forcibly medicating Loughner with 
psychotropic drugs”). 
 277. Id. at *1. 
 278. United States. v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 745 n.10 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 279. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) 
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involved). “Grave disability,” “need for treatment,” and “danger to 
self,” whose definitions could all certainly be broadened to include a 
severe psychotic episode, are arguably among those potentially 
overriding interests. 
B.  First Amendment 
In his concurrence in Riggins, Justice Kennedy explained that 
the right for an accused to testify in his or her own words is “related 
to the Fifth Amendment choice to speak [with the] ‘unfettered 
exercise of his own will.’”280 He expressed concern that “medication 
of the type here prescribed may be for the very purpose of imposing 
constraints on the defendant’s own will, and for that reason its 
legitimacy is put in grave doubt.”281
The interests involved in a criminal proceeding and how they 
should factor into the involuntary treatment debate are beyond the 
scope of this Article—which looks at involuntary treatment in a more 
general sense. But while Justice Kennedy and the other Justices did 
not address the First Amendment directly in that case, the concern 
expressed above clearly related to how much the drugs were 
interfering with the free thought processes of the mind that contribute 
to free speech as well. The First Amendment has been used as the 
basis for objection to forced medication in other cases.282
To engage with the question of whether antipsychotics unduly 
interfere with rights of free speech, free thought, or free will (three 
rather weighty autonomy interests), one must have some 
understanding of what antipsychotic medications are doing to the 
brain. Unfortunately, however, the science is not entirely clear. 
The brain contains certain chemicals called neurotransmitters 
that transmit signals between nerve cells.283 “All currently approved 
antipsychotic medications block dopamine receptors.”284 Some also 
affect the neurotransmitter serotonin.285 Because of “the tight 
 280. Id. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 (1987)). 
 281. Id.
 282. See, e.g., United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Brandon, 
158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Weston, 36 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999); State v. 
Adams, 888 P.2d 1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
 283. See Mossman, supra note 135, at 1053. 
 284. Demjaha et al., supra note 166, at 1203. 
 285. Schizophrenia, Treatment and Drugs, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org 
/diseases-conditions/schizophrenia/basics/treatment/con-20021077 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
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correlation between the clinical potency and the [specific dopamine 
receptor]-blocking action” scientists had theorized that “dopamine 
overactivity could be the common denominator in the psychotic 
element of schizophrenia.”286
Known as the “dopamine hypothesis,” it became clear with 
further research that the hypothesis had weaknesses, for some 
patients failed to respond to treatment despite highly successful 
blockades of a specific dopamine receptor, and other patients 
responded well to treatment with a much lower blockade rate.287 The 
dopamine hypothesis has necessarily been “[r]efined and modified 
in . . . intervening years” but to this “date remains central to the 
pathophysiology of schizophrenia.”288 Recent studies suggest that 
“dopaminergic excess may . . . be an early pathogenic condition 
leading to irreversible cortical dysfunction.”289
Thus, although scientists have evidence-supported hypotheses as 
to how these drugs work, and have discovered some of their 
functions in the brain, it is not yet certain why some people respond 
well and others do not, nor why a drug like clozapine has superior 
antipsychotic effect to the other antipsychotic drugs.290
When they are successful, these drugs do eliminate or reduce 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia such as hallucinations, agitation, 
and delusions.291 Hallucinations and agitation generally recede 
within days, while delusions generally take several weeks to 
subside—but there is no absolute rule due to the variety of people’s 
responses to antipsychotic medications.292
 286. Philip Seeman & Shitij Kapur, Schizophrenia: More Dopamine, More D2 Receptors, 97
PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 7673, 7673–75 (July 5, 2000), available at http:// 
bjp.rcpsych.org/content/181/4/271.fullhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC33999/. 
 287. See H. M. Jones and L.S. Pilowsky, Dopamine and Antipsychotic Drug Action Revisited,
181 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 271, 271–75 (2002). 
 288. Rebecca Kuepper et al., The Dopamine Dysfunction in Psychosis Revisited: New Insights 
Into Topography and Course, in 212 CURRENT ANTIPSYCHOTICS, HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL PHARMACOLOGY 79 (Gerhard Gross & Mark A. Geyer eds., 2012). 
 289. Id.
 290. “Although many attempts have been made to explain clozapine’s superior antipsychotic 
effect, the [mechanism of action] is still poorly understood.” Magdalena Nord & Lars Farde, 
Antipsychotic Occupancy of Dopamine Receptors in Schizophrenia, 17 CNS NEUROSCIENCE &
THERAPEUTICS 97 (Apr. 2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111 
/j.1755-5949.2010.00222.x/full. 
 291. NIMH, SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 25, at 10. 
 292. Id.
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Therefore, it is true that antipsychotic drugs change the thought 
processes of psychotic patients, but they do not, in the words of one 
court, seize “control of . . . mind and thoughts.”293 The typical 
medical view of the issue was explained well by Professor Douglas 
Mossman: 
[P]ersons who are psychotic have severely impaired 
thinking abilities, and antipsychotic medications can, by 
reducing this impairment, improve thinking and thereby 
confer greater freedom of expression on their recipients. . . . 
Psychosis is itself involuntary mind control of the most 
extensive kind and itself represents the most severe 
intrusion on the integrity of the human being. . . . 
psychotropic medications do not alter a patient’s thoughts 
about specific political or social issues. Properly 
administered, they improve a psychotic patient’s ability to 
think about whatever he wishes. . . . Neuroleptics are to 
psychosis what eye glasses are to myopia: both 
interventions remove impediments to perception; neither 
proscribes particular thoughts or actions, though both may 
enhance decision making and the ability to respond.294
Although the metaphor of eyeglasses makes an interesting point, 
it is also illustrative of some chinks in the medical viewpoint. First, 
eyeglasses carry no risk of dangerous side effects. Second, they are 
not so intrusive or irreversible as a foreign substance entering the 
body. And third, while it is true that there is no mind control in terms 
of specifically implanted thoughts on any particular topic, the drugs 
do alter the mind by “suppress[ing] psychotic thoughts.”295
However, on the latter point (the one most relevant to the First 
Amendment argument), I agree with Professor Elyn Saks that the 
drugs are not “invidiously mind-controlling in any sense of the 
word[, but] [a]s the drugs improve [or change] . . . we will have to 
grapple with these issues further.”296 Due to the lack of present or 
recent progress on the drug front for psychotic diseases like 
schizophrenia, this analysis remains unchanged.297 The drugs alter 
 293. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747 (La. 1992). 
 294. Mossman, supra note 136, at 1130–31 (quotations and citations omitted). 
 295. SAKS, supra note 48, at 110. 
 296. Id. at 116. 
 297. See Editorial, supra note 8.  
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the mind, but the changes are toward allowing the patient to once 
again form his or her own more reality-based thoughts. The drugs are 
thus arguably not destroying autonomy but enhancing it—especially 
when one considers the implications on freedom to make other 
choices. A psychotic individual is not nearly as free as a stable-
minded one to choose to pursue an education, a job, and meaningful 
relationships due to the intellectual limitations imposed by the 
illness. 
But if later drugs were shown to encroach too much on the 
integrity of the personhood of a patient, the “stakes [might] 
change.”298 Science has in the not-too-distant past been quick to 
embrace methods that later were deemed far too great an 
encroachment in just that sense.299 “The ethical problem pivots on 
how much a state should be able to change its citizens.”300
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court arguably has shown 
some signs of agreement with the position that the First Amendment 
is not violated by involuntary administration of antipsychotics. One 
court explained: 
We note that the petitioner in Sell claimed that he had a 
“fundamental, first amendment right to avoid forced 
medication aimed at changing the way he thinks.” The 
standard articulated in Sell did not, however, require that 
the trial court consider a defendant’s First Amendment 
rights in determining whether involuntary medication is 
proper. The United States Supreme Court, thus, implicitly 
rejected the petitioner’s claim that an incompetent 
 298. SAKS, supra note 48, at 116. 
 299. For example, Egas Moniz won the Nobel Prize in 1949 for inventing prefrontal 
lobotomies, which are now “remembered as one of the most spectacular failures in the history of 
medicine.” Jenell Johnson, A Dark History: Memories of Lobotomy in the New Era of 
Psychosurgery, 1 MED. STUDIES 367, 367 (2009), available at http://link.springer.com 
/article/10.1007%2Fs12376-009-0031-7?LI=true#page-2. “Lobotomies for mental illness fell out 
of favor in the 1960s because of the development of effective antipsychotic medications, misuse 
of the procedure, and a growing unease among doctors with the confusion and stupor that resulted 
from the operation.” Barron H. Lerner, When Lobotomy Was Seen as Advanced, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/health/report-on-eva-peron-recalls-time-
when-lobotomy-was-embraced.html?_r=0. 
 300. EAGLEMAN, supra note 127, at 181–82. 
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defendant has a First Amendment right to avoid involuntary 
medication.301
C.  Less Intrusive Means 
One of the relevant factors in both Riggins and Sell was whether 
“less intrusive means” than forcible administration of antipsychotic 
drugs were available.302 Have scientific developments produced less 
intrusive means of treating an illness like schizophrenia? The short 
answer is “no.” Antipsychotic drugs are still the most effective 
known means of controlling the positive symptoms of a disease like 
schizophrenia.
As discussed previously, there has been progress toward 
developing a more personalized approach to treatment. Dr. Meltzer 
explains that just as the current cutting edge breakthroughs in cancer 
research stem from genetic identification of what mutation has 
caused the cancer and then developing specific therapies, Dr. Meltzer 
states that science is “just at the threshold” of such developments in 
treating severe mental illnesses within the Psychotic Spectrum.303
He and other scholars have been highly critical of the NIMH’s 
Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness Study 
(CATIE) that has periodically released findings beginning in 2005 
regarding the treatment of schizophrenia: Dr. Meltzer called the 
study “miserably designed” for the purposes asserted.304 But he 
would presumably agree with the study’s lead author that “the 
medications had significant differences and that the treatment should 
be individualized.”305 An individualized approach would presumably 
be less intrusive in that it could be more effective and provide less 
 301. State v. Jacobs, 828 A.2d 587, 589 n.3 (Conn. 2003). Sell also recognized that refusals 
may be overridden if the government interest is sufficiently strong. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 
166, 178–79 (2003). 
 302. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
 303. Meltzer, supra note 195. 
 304. Id.; Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE), NAT’L INST.
MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/trials/practical/catie/index.shtml; see, e.g., Brakel & 
Davis, supra note 83, at 522 (discussing the uselessness of the CATIE study from a legal policy 
standpoint because of the numerous limitations placed upon the study); Samuel Jan Brakel, 
Searching for the Therapy in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 455, 499 n.59 (2007) (expressing the various follies of the CATIE trial including 
the type of drugs compared, biased influences of drug company funding, and other various 
shortcomings of the methodology of the trial). 
 305. Mossman & Steinberg, supra note 185, at 294 (citing Jeffrey A. Lieberman, What the 
CATIE Study Means for Clinical Practice, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1075 (2006)). 
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severe side effects for the patient, but it would still involve the forced 
administration of antipsychotic drugs. 
For non-positive symptoms of schizophrenia, however, there are 
new discoveries of possibly effective treatments that would be less 
intrusive than the forced administration of drugs. For example, in 
February 2012, a study was published showing improvement in 
reality-monitoring among schizophrenic patients who attended eighty 
hours of computerized cognitive training.306 “Reality-monitoring is 
the ability to separate the inner world from outer reality. . . . It is a 
complex cognitive function that is impaired in schizophrenia.”307
Brain scans also showed that this improvement correlated with 
increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex—a region of the 
brain that supports self-referential cognition. And recovery of 
activity in that brain region was associated with improved social 
functioning six months later.308 The study suggests that “the neural 
impairments in schizophrenia are not immutably fixed but may be 
amenable to well-designed interventions that target restoration of 
neural system functioning.”309 These findings “set[] the groundwork 
for what could be a new treatment approach in psychiatric illness—a 
new tool we could use in addition to medication, psychotherapeutic 
approaches or cognitive behavioral approaches.”310
Indeed, the NIMH is currently funding a trial at eleven U.S. 
research centers to evaluate the effectiveness of computer-based 
treatment of cognitive impairment in schizophrenia for potential 
 306. Karuna Subramaniam et al., Computerized Cognitive Training Restores Neural Activity 
within the Reality Monitoring Network in Schizophrenia, 73 NEURON 842 (Feb. 2012), available 
at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627312000499. 
 307. Karuna Subramaniam, the study’s first author, quoted in Rick Nauert, Computer Therapy 
for Schizophrenia, PSYCHCENTRAL (Mar. 1, 2012), http://psychcentral.com/news/2012/03 
/01/computer-therapy-for-schizophrenia/35457.html.  
 308. Subramaniam et al., supra note 306. 
 309. Jason Bardi, Schizophrenia Patients’ Ability to Monitor Reality May Be Helped by 
Computerized Training: UCSF Study Shows Digital Cognitive Training Improves Brain Function 
And Behavior for People with Schizophrenia, UCSF (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.ucsf.edu/news 
/2012/02/11567/schizophrenia-patients-ability-monitor-reality-may-be-helped-computerized 
(quoting Sophia Vinogradov, MD, the study’s senior author and professor and interim associate 
chief of staff for mental health at SFVAMC and interim vice chair of psychiatry at UCSF). 
 310. Id. (quoting Karuna Subramaniam).
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FDA approval.311 Currently there are no FDA-approved treatments 
for cognitive impairments—a “devastating aspect of the illness.”312
Certainly such treatments would be less intrusive than forced 
medication, since they do not involve inserting a foreign substance 
into the body. But these new developments are not entirely helpful to 
the “less intrusive” analysis for several reasons. The computer-based 
treatments do not currently address the psychosis, delusions, and 
hallucinations associated with the positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Therefore, they cannot be viewed as an alternative, 
but rather an addition to psychotropic medications. 
If at some point less intrusive means that could treat the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia were discovered or developed, this 
would be relevant to allowing a patient to choose that form of 
treatment rather than forced drugging. A patient would likely do so if 
the concern was the severity of side effects of the drugs (as it often 
is). But if a patient refused all types of treatment, perhaps either 
because the patient did not believe or did not want to believe he or 
she was ill, it would be impossible to force compliance with a 
method such as computer training. Thus if a court were to decide 
forced treatment was appropriate, it would presumably have to resort 
to forced administration of antipsychotics rather than such less 
intrusive treatments—unless a court order (or threat thereof) 
convinced the patient to willingly submit to treatment. But as science 
now stands, there is no alternative to drugs for stemming the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia. 
Thus, at least in the context of the present scientific model, the 
standard proposed above should be able to withstand common 
constitutional challenges. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, society would eliminate stigma and find a 
complete cure without side effects for these severe mental illnesses 
 311. FDA to Evaluate Computer-Based Treatment for Cognitive Symptoms in Schizophrenia,
BRAIN & BEHAVIOR RES. FOUND. (June 28, 2012), http://bbrfoundation.org/brain-matters-
discoveries/fda-to-evaluate-computer-based-treatment-for-cognitive-symptoms-in. 
 312. Id.; see also Researchers Evaluate Computer-based Treatment for People with 
Schizophrenia: Study Offers Hope for the Most-Costly Mental Illness in the United States,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 27, 2012), http://www.mediawebsite.net/danews/story 
/?catSetID=7007&catID=290937&nrid=160511845&page=1 (quoting Dr. Richard Keefe, stating 
that “there are no FDA-approved treatments for this devastating aspect of the illness.”). 
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that patients would gladly take on their own volition. As that 
prospect looks distant under the current scientific regime, society 
must strike a balance between autonomy and patient welfare that is 
not blind to the unique limitations on decision-making for severely 
mentally ill patients—especially during episodes of active psychosis. 
And as scientific insights into these diseases accelerate, we must be 
willing to revise standards to logically reflect that increased 
understanding. This is one such effort. It, too, should be subject to 
revision as the science and studies of outcomes continue to progress. 
